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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a discussion of the problems 
associated with endogeneity in empirical accounting research. We emphasize problems 
arising when endogeneity is caused by (1) unobservable firm specific factors and (2) omitted 
variables and discuss the merits and drawbacks of using panel data techniques to address 
these causes. Second, we investigate the magnitude of endogeneity bias in Ordinary Least 
Squares regressions of cost-of-debt capital on firm disclosure policy. We document how 
including a set of variables which theory suggests to be related with both cost-of-debt capital 
and disclosure and using fixed effects estimation in a panel dataset reduces the endogeneity 
bias and produces consistent results. This analysis reveals that the effect of disclosure policy 
on cost-of-debt capital is 200% higher than what is found in Ordinary Least Squares 
estimation. Finally, we provide direct evidence that disclosure is impacted by unobservable 
firm-specific factors that are also correlated with cost-of-capital.   
 
JEL-code: M41; G3; C23 







                                                     
§ We thank Christine Botosan and Marlene Plumlee for providing us with the AIMR disclosure scores.  
Parts of this study were written while Valeri Nikolaev visited the Sloan School at MIT. We gratefully 
acknowledge helpful comments from Jan Bouwens, Peter Easton, Stephan Hollander, David Larcker, 
Christian Leuz, Matt Pinnuck, Maarten Pronk, Konstantin Rozanov, Tjomme Rusticus, Jeroen Suijs, 
Paula van Veen, Hylke Vandenbussche, Heidi Vander Bauwhede, Sofie Van der Meulen, Marleen 
Willekens, Peter Wysocki, and from workshop participants at the universities of Amsterdam (VU), 
Leuven, Melbourne and Tilburg. We also appreciate the constructive feedback from the Editor and two 
anonymous reviewers of European Accounting Review. 
* Corresponding author. PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands. Telephone: + 31 13 466 
8288, Fax: + 31 13 466 8001. E-mail: V.Nikolaev@uvt.nl  
 2
The Endogeneity Bias in the Relation between Cost-of-Debt Capital 
and Corporate Disclosure Policy. 
 
Introduction 
 Corporate disclosure policy is one of the most widely researched topics in accounting. 
Theory has generally suggested a negative causal relation between the quality of information 
disclosed by a firm and its cost of capital (Verrecchia, 2001; Dye, 2001; Easley and O’Hara, 
2004).  The basic idea is that disclosure reduces both the information differences and 
incentive problems between the firm and its investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Investors, 
then,  ‘reward’ firms for high-quality disclosures with lower required returns.  
In recent years, however, both the existence and sign of the relation between 
disclosure and cost-of-capital has been called into question not in the least because the 
empirical literature has provided conflicting results. While some studies find strong negative 
associations consistent with theoretical predictions (Welker, 1995; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000; Sengupta, 1998), other fails to document a significant relation (Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002; Botosan and Frost, 1998), find only partial evidence (Botosan, 1997; Healy et al., 1999; 
Richardson and Welker, 2001) or even report a positive association (Heiflin, Shaw and Wild, 
2003). 
Some commentators have pointed to the possibility of endogeneity bias as a potential 
explanation why empirical findings are not consistent with theory and report contradicting 
results with regard to the sign of the relation  (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001; Zhang, 
2001).1  It is well know that endogeneity causes Ordinary Least Squares regressions to be 
biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002). Findings from OLS regressions of cost-of-capital 
onto disclosure are difficult to interpret in the presence of endogeneity and this may very well 
account for the lack of agreement in the empirical literature on the sign of the relation. 
                                                     
1 Other potential explanations for these conflicting results are the current high standards of mandatory 
disclosure (rendering voluntary disclosure choices of second order importance) and measurement 
problems in the somewhat elusive key constructs of ‘information problems’ and ‘disclosure quality’ 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Zhang, 2001). 
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We document the effect of endogeneity bias on the relation between disclosure and 
cost-of-debt capital. We define endogeneity bias broadly as any situation where the 
disturbance term of the structural equation is correlated with one or more independent 
variables.2 Intuitively, our reasoning is that differences exist in the cost of debt that are 
correlated with the firm’s disclosure policy, but that are not necessarily caused by this policy. 
Instead, these differences are caused either by (1) unobservable heterogeneity among firms in 
a cross sectional sample or (2) observable determinants of cost-of-debt capital which are 
correlated with disclosure but omitted from the analysis. Note that these two sources of 
endogeneity bias are both variations of the correlated omitted variable problem and are in fact 
theoretically equivalent. To an empirical researcher they are different, however, because the 
first source is unobservable and should be roughly constant over time, while the second is 
observable and may change over the period of investigation. We will provide an illustration of 
both sources of endogeneity bias in turn. 
One example of unobserved heterogeneity is the difference in ‘costs of disclosure’3 
among firms. High costs of disclosure will reduce the optimal level of disclosure and at the 
same time increase the equilibrium cost-of-capital (Zhang, 2001). While in a cross sectional 
analysis, it will appear as if disclosure is causally related to cost-of-capital, what we observe 
in fact are equilibrium changes of both disclosure level and cost-of-capital each caused by the 
unobservable firm-specific characteristic of ‘costs of disclosure’. 
 At least some of the determinants of a firm’s disclosure choice would appear to be 
also related to the default risk of the firm (Jaffee, 1975, Kidwell et al. 1984; Fung and Rudd, 
1986), and as such impact on the cost-of-debt.4  For example, larger firms are generally 
                                                     
2 This definition is consistent with the econometrics literature (Greene, 2000; Wooldridge, 2002) and 
with the proposal in Chenhall and Moers (2004). 
3 Often these costs of disclosure are defined to include the costs of collecting, processing, reporting and 
verifying information and the cost due to loss of competitiveness (see, e.g., Wagenhofer, 1990; Guo, 
Lev and Zhou, 2004). Potentially interesting definitions also refer to the costs associated with 
uncertainty about investor reactions to a certain disclosure (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003; Verrecchia, 
2001) or litigation costs (Skinner, 1997).   
4 Within standard asset pricing models, such as the CAPM, only undiversifiable risk is priced on the 
market, and therefore we have to assume that the proposed joint determinants of ‘cost-of-debt capital’, 
such as the firm’s default risk, are at least partly correlated across firms. Indeed, an often-heard critique 
on studies that relate disclosure to cost of capital is that differences in disclosure quality are 
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considered less risky and therefore enjoy lower cost-of-debt capital (Fama and French, 1992, 
1993). Larger firms also benefit from economies of scale in producing information. They 
usually have specialized departments set up to deal with investors’ information needs and it 
will generally be less costly for them to compile more information and disclose it to the 
capital market. Empirically, size is significantly correlated with disclosure in many studies. In 
sum, size is associated both with cost-of-debt and with disclosure. When omitted from the 
analysis, one may find a negative relation between cost-of-debt and disclosure policy, but this 
association is likely driven by firm size.  
 After a brief review of the econometrics of endogeneity, we discuss in more detail the 
sources of endogeneity bias in the relation between disclosure and cost of capital. We then 
document empirically the effect of endogeneity bias in regressions of cost-of-debt capital on 
disclosure policy. Specifically, we use Sengupta’s (1998) original model5 as a starting point 
of our analysis and replicate this study’s results in a sample similar to his.  As in Sengupta, 
we establish a strong negative association between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. We 
then augment Sengupta’s model with variables that are known to be associated with a firm’s 
disclosure policy and which are likely to affect cost-of-debt capital in order to address the 
endogeneity bias caused by omitted variables. Our results show that the coefficient on 
disclosure is reduced to approximately 50% of its former magnitude in the benchmark model 
and disclosure is no longer significantly related to cost-of-debt capital in the augmented 
version of our regressions. The omitted variable effect seems substantial.  
Next, we evaluate both sources of endogeneity bias at the same time and use panel 
data techniques to estimate the augmented model. We find that once observable determinants 
                                                                                                                                                        
idiosyncratic and therefore should not ‘survive the forces of diversification’ (Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2005: 1) nor impact on the cost-of-capital. Leuz and Verrecchia (2005), in contrast, argue that 
disclosure improves the coordination between the firm and its investors with respect to capital 
investment decisions. As such, poor disclosure quality can lead to misaligned investments and higher 
cost-of-capital. Other studies have suggested that disclosure may impact on cost-of-capital, even if it is 
idiosyncratic, because it improves market liquidity (Verrecchia, 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), 
reduces estimation risk (Barry and Brown, 1985) or increases the investor base (Merton, 1987).   
5 Sengupta’s model provides a convenient vehicle to illustrate the effect of endogeneity bias in 
disclosure research. It is also to some extent an arbitrary choice since endogeneity bias is present in 
many contexts in (financial) accounting research and many potential candidates exist for similar 
analysis as is conducted in this paper. Chenhall and Moers (2004), Ittner and Larcker (2001), and 
Larcker and Rusticus (2005) provide helpful discussions of endogeneity in accounting research. 
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of disclosure and cost-of-debt capital are included in the regression and the estimation 
technique controls for firm-specific effects, we re-establish the negative association between 
disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. The association is stronger than before and the difference 
is economically significant – the fixed effects coefficient on disclosure is over 200% larger 
than the OLS coefficient in the same model – which suggests that the cost-of-capital benefits 
of increased disclosure are much larger than previously thought and economically significant. 
Based on these analyses, our beliefs about the existence of endogeneity bias in the benchmark 
model are reinforced. We then suggest a simple procedure to directly assess whether the 
independent variables in the regression (in particular, the disclosure policy variable) are 
associated with unobservable firm heterogeneity and document that, in fact, disclosure policy 
is strongly positively correlated with firm heterogeneity.  
Synthesizing our findings, we show that at the level of the individual firm, increases 
in disclosure are causally6 associated with lower cost-of-debt capital. However, in cross-
sectional analyses that do not control for endogeneity bias, a negative association between 
these two variables should not be interpreted causally and is likely caused by firm 
heterogeneity effects, which are compounded in the disclosure variable. The resulting 
association between disclosure and cost-of-capital is (at least partly) spurious. 
 Together these results speak strongly in favor of dealing explicitly with endogeneity 
when investigating the relation between disclosure policy and cost-of-capital. Note that while 
endogeneity has been identified as the ‘most important limitation’ (Healy and Palepu, 2001, 
430) of disclosure studies, few attempts have been made to address the issue empirically 
(Cohen, 2003).  
 The remainder of this paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 provides a self-
contained discussion of the econometrics of endogeneity bias in the context of financial 
accounting research. Section 3 discusses firm heterogeneity and correlated omitted 
determinants as two sources of endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital 
                                                     
6 We recognize that causal statements cannot be made based on statistical considerations, but only on 
theory. When we refer to a causal relation, we use this as shorthand for ‘a causal relation as suggested 
by theory and underpinned by empirical evidence’. 
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and disclosure. Section 4 outlines the research design and provides the variable definitions. 
Section 5 describes the sample and some summary statistics. Section 6 presents the empirical 
results on the extent of endogeneity bias in the association between disclosure and cost-of-
debt capital. The final section summarizes the results and discusses the limitations to our 
analyses. 
2. A note on endogeneity 
The traditional textbook definition of endogeneity we used so far requires the 
disturbance term in the structural equation to be correlated with one or more explanatory 
variables. This rather arcane definition is not very helpful to applied researchers. We therefore 
propose a more intuitive definition (following Heckman, 2000), which is closer to the practice 
of economists. Economics “undertakes to study the effect which will be produced by certain 
causes, not absolutely, but subject to the condition that other things are equal and that causes 
are able to work out their effects undisturbed” (Marshall 1961, p. 36). Researchers aim at 
identification of these causal effects, which is done by measuring the effect of a certain cause 
while holding all the other causes in the model constant. This in itself is not a straightforward 
task since many causes will not vary independently. Our intuitive definition of endogeneity 
then is any situation where the ceteris paribus condition is not fulfilled whenever the 
independent variable of interest is changed.  
Empirical researchers typically use an economic model or informal reasoning to 
arrive at a structural model, which represents the causal relations between the variables of 
interest. Although theory or earlier empirical work will often suggest that many of these 
variables cannot be said to be truly exogenous, empirical researchers will have to assume 
some are, to estimate the parameters of the structural model. A careful justification of why 
certain variables are exogenous is therefore required. In his presidential address, Demski 
(2004) advocates to explicate the micro foundations (preferences, expectations) of the choice 
behavior of economic actors in the relation under study and to apply equilibrium reasoning to 
derive a structural model. Such procedure allows for a better understanding of how all the 
salient aspects of behavior, such as causal effects, are captured into the model.  
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 Suppose an empirical researcher is interested in the following structural model: 
uxxxy kk ++++= ααα ...2211                                                              (Equation A) 
where y, x1, x2, … xk are observable random scalars and u is the unobservable random 
disturbance. An explanatory variable xj is said to be endogenous in equation A if it is 
correlated with the disturbance term u; xj is exogenous if it is uncorrelated with the 
disturbance term. It is important to stress that in this ‘empirical’ or econometric definition, 
variables are inherently neither exogenous nor endogenous; instead their nature is conditional 
on the way the structural model is written (Greene, 2000). An empirical researcher will be 
interested in estimating the parameters in the structural model. It is important to the researcher 
to know whether an explanatory variable is endogenous in a specific structural equation 
because it affects the way in which its parameter should be estimated. The upshot of all this is 
that it is paramount to be careful when using the words ‘endogenous’ or ‘exogenous’, since 
these designations are context-specific. The litmus test of the econometric form of 
endogeneity is whether the parameters of interest in the context of a specific structural model 
are affected by correlation between any explanatory variables and the disturbance term 
(Maddala, 2001). If they are the variable is said to be endogenous, if not it is exogenous. 
Since there is no clean-cut statistic or diagnostic instrument available to ‘test’ for 
endogeneity, the econometrics literature often advises empirical researchers to apply 
introspection (Wooldridge, 2002) or the criterion of reasonableness7 (Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 
2003) as a way to determine whether there is an endogeneity problem. It would appear that 
researchers are left rather vulnerable against allegations that their model suffers from 
‘endogeneity problems’. In the end, researchers have to determine which variables they care 
about (i.e., are the focus of their analysis) and should therefore be as free from bias as 
possible, and which variables they do not care about and are only in the model as a control. 
Bias in the estimates of the latter variables are less of a problem and should not be weighted 
to heavily when evaluating the soundness of empirical work. 
                                                     
7 One test is that the choices made should be palatable to the researcher’s peers. 
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Sources of ‘econometric’ endogeneity 
The source of correlation between the structural disturbance and an explanatory 
variable is important because it provides clues how endogeneity can be addressed. 
Wooldridge (2002) lists three common sources of endogeneity: (1) omitted variables, (2) 
simultaneity and (3) measurement error. Our discussion will focus on the first two of these. 
Considerable advances have been made to mitigate measurement error in variables using 
latent variables techniques. While some of the methods to address endogeneity we discuss 
below may also reduce measurement error, the literature seems to move towards the use of 
these latent variables techniques (Larcker and Rusticus, 2005), and we defer further 
elaboration here. Note that each source of econometric endogeneity will affect the consistency 
of the estimation in a similar fashion and as such confound the interpretation of the 
regressions. 
Omitted variables: causes 
The first source of endogeneity arises if the structural disturbance term consists of 
omitted variables and these variables are correlated with one or more of the explanatory 
variables. This may occur because data is not available on those variables the researcher 
would like to include additionally into the model.  These omitted variables are said to be 
unobservable to the researcher.8  Omitted variables also may be due to a failure of the 
researcher to include all the observable factors theory suggest to be important in explaining 
the dependent variable. Economic relations are often such that two factors that are 
determinants of the same dependent variable will be mutually associated. If one such factor is 
omitted from the analysis and thus included in the disturbance term, the latter will be 
correlated with the included factor. One special case of omitted observable variables arises 
when the omitted variable is a function of an explanatory variable in the model. This type of 
omitted variable problem is often referred to as ‘functional form misspecification’. 
                                                     
8 While the disturbance term then includes variables that are unobservable to the researcher, these 
factors may very well be observable to the economic agent under study. Indeed, endogeneity arises 
when the explanatory variables represent decisions made by the agent on the basis of such factors 
(Hayashi, 2000). 
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In sum, omitted variables can be either observable or unobservable to the researcher. 
Omitted variables are captured by the disturbance term in the structural equation. When these 
omitted variables are correlated with explanatory variable xi, then xi is endogenous in that 
particular structural equation.  
Omitted variables: potential ‘solutions’  
We emphasized that omitted variables may be either observable or unobservable to 
the researcher because this dimension matters when trying to mitigate the problems associated 
with estimating the parameters in the structural model. It should be noted that it is unlikely for 
any of the methods we describe to resolve fully the issues associated with endogeneity. 
Omitted observable variables. This source of endogeneity can be addressed by 
including all factors that are important in explaining the dependent variable and, at the same 
time, are associated with one of the explanatory variables, into the structural equation. Factors 
that are associated with both dependent and one or more explanatory variables are said to be 
‘joint determinants’.  In practical terms, this will usually require the researcher to conduct a 
thorough review of the extant theoretical and empirical literatures to identify these joint 
determinants. Once included in the structural model, the disturbance term is purged from the 
source of its correlation with the explanatory variables and the estimation of the parameters of 
interest should no longer be affected by endogeneity. 
Omitted unobservable variables. Since the researcher will not be able to gather data 
on omitted variables that are unobservable, our earlier recipe of including any joint 
determinants will no longer work. We will discuss two distinct instances of omitted 
unobservable variables and methods to address these, which are relevant to the accounting 
literature, (1) self-selection and (2) firm-specific heterogeneity.   
Self or sample-selection arises if the probability that a firm is included into the 
sample and the dependent variable are both affected by an (omitted unobservable) variable.  
As a result the sample is no longer random. Alternatively, the omitted unobservable variable 
may affect the way in which an observation is categorized within the sample, although all 
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observations are included.9  A good example in an accounting context is provided by Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000). These authors study a sample of firms that have switched from a 
German to an international reporting regime. They are interested in the question whether a 
commitment to increased disclosure, as required under international standards, has tangible 
benefits in the form of lower cost-of-capital. Firms will decide on disclosure based on the 
expected consequences with regard to their cost-of-capital. Therefore, the factors that 
determine the disclosure choice (expected net cost-of-capital benefit) are likely to also affect 
the dependent variable, current cost-of-capital.  Simply regressing cost-of-capital on 
disclosure would not do in this context because it ignores the fact that only those firms with 
positive expected net cost of capital benefits will have selected to switch reporting regime. As 
Leuz and Verrecchia are careful to point out, without discounting this selection effect the 
association between disclosure and cost-of-capital will be overstated for those firms that have 
switched regimes and understated for the firms that have not. Although, the expected net 
benefits of increased disclosure to the firm are unobservable to the researcher, they should be 
accounted for when estimating the structural model of interest. This is usually done by 
modeling the selection mechanism explicitly and adjusting the estimation of the parameters in 
the structural model for the selection effect. Heckman’s (1979) procedure offers an often-
used, easily implemented approach to achieve this.  
Firm-specific heterogeneity. Unobserved omitted variables often represent features of 
the firm that are given and do not change over the period in question. Specifically, firm 
characteristics like managerial ability, structural arrangements, and employee skills can be 
thought of as roughly constant over time.  As before, if these firm characteristics impact on 
both the dependent variable and one or more explanatory variables, the structural disturbance 
(which captures heterogeneity across units of observation) will be correlated with those 
explanatory variables. For example, more talented managers may prefer high-quality 
                                                     
9 Self selection bias will also arise when the sample is truncated or censored, or sampling is on the 
dependent variable. When sampling is on one of the exogenous variables, the sample will not be 
random but estimation of the structural model is unaffected (Wooldridge, 2002). See also Shehata 
(1991) for a discussion of selection bias issues in an accounting context. 
 11
disclosures and, at the same time, the market may think these managers better ‘risks’ and 
charge a lower cost-of-capital. The talent of management is difficult to observe for a 
researcher and should be relatively constant. Regressions of cost-of-capital onto disclosure 
are affected by firm-specific heterogeneity bias if the talent of managers is not properly 
discounted.  
Firm-specific heterogeneity can be addressed in several ways. Researchers may find a 
proxy variable for the firm characteristic and plug this into the structural equation. 
Alternatively, instruments might be available for those explanatory variables that are 
correlated with the unobservable firm characteristic and instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
can be used to estimate the parameters of the structural equation consistently (see, 
Wooldridge, 2002). Often, it will be the case that accounting researchers can observe a firm at 
different points in time. If so, panel data techniques are available to account for heterogeneity. 
Since the choice of which method to use to address firm-specific heterogeneity 
directly impinges on our empirical work and is of practical concern in many other settings as 
well, we digress briefly from the main topic and discuss the tradeoffs involved when using IV 
versus panel data techniques.10 Asymptotically, IV and fixed effects estimation must agree,11 
which makes it relevant to compare their properties in applied settings.12 Panel data 
techniques address a narrower problem because they can only deal with time-invariant 
omitted variables. IV estimation does not assume that firm characteristics are constant and 
hence admits modelling the impact of a broader set of unobservable variables. Nevertheless, 
IV estimation is vulnerable to producing misleading results when the instruments used are not 
valid or weak.  Instrument variables must be independent of the (unobservable) structural 
disturbance term and as highly correlated as possible with the explanatory variable they 
represent. The first condition cannot be tested; the second is frequently not met in practice 
                                                     
10 This discussion is geared towards one panel data technique in particular: fixed effect estimation. 
11 If fixed effects and IV estimation do not agree, the implication is that the model is misspecified (e.g., 
the instruments are invalid or endogeneity is not alleviated by fixed effects estimation. A Hausman-
type test may be used to discriminate between the estimators.  
12 It is not immediate which estimator will be more efficient asymptotically. This will depend on the 
number and quality of instruments and the amount of within-variation. 
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(Larcker and Rusticus, 2005). Not only is it often difficult to find valid and strong instruments 
in applied settings, the choice between alternative candidate instruments is subjective and 
may impact on the robustness of the empirical work.13 Panel data techniques, on the other 
hand, are easy to implement and do not involve a subjective choice by the researcher. They 
assume, however, that the relation under study is essentially driven by changes within the 
firm, not by differences between firms. In other words, the cross-sectional variation should be 
limited compared to changes within firms. Since panel data techniques require multiple 
observations of a firm, the likelihood of a selection bias is higher than when IV estimation is 
applied.  In sum, neither IV estimation nor panel data techniques dominate when trying to 
solve for endogeneity. The final choice between the two methods will depend on the specifics 
of the research design. 
We conclude this section on omitted variables with an often-misunderstood fact. The 
mere fact that some variable represents a decision (or choice) to the firm or, more generally, 
an economic agent, is not in itself sufficient for ‘econometric endogeneity’ to arise.  Only if 
the factors that impact on the decision by the economic agent, whether observable or nor, are 
also inter-related with the dependent variable will endogeneity exist. 
Simultaneity: causes 
In many settings of interest to accounting researchers, the data generating process is 
essentially such that variables are simultaneously determined and interdependent. 
Simultaneity arises when at least one of the explanatory variables is determined 
simultaneously along with the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2002). If so, the structural 
disturbance and the explanatory variable will be correlated. Intuitively, one can think of 
simultaneity as describing instantaneous feedback relations among variables. An accounting 
example is provided in Welker (1995). This author is interested in the relation between 
disclosure policy and liquidity in equity markets. He notes that effective corporate disclosure 
will mitigate information problems in the market and thus increase liquidity. At the same 
                                                     
13 It is often not immediate whether including more than one instrumental variable is beneficial in finite 
sample settings. See, e.g., Kennedy (2003) for a discussion. A Sargan (1958) - Hansen (1982) test is 
available to evaluate whether extra instruments should be used.  
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time, corporate disclosure may be influenced by the information differences between the firm 
and the market and thus by current liquidity. There is an ‘equilibrium feedback mechanism’ 
(Griffiths et al. 1993) operating on disclosure and liquidity to determine the equilibrium 
outcomes for both variables.    
Simultaneity: potential ‘solutions’ 
To capture instantaneous feedback relations, researchers write a system of equations 
that consists of separate structural equations for each endogenous variable. When variables y1 
impacts on y2 and vice versa, y2 would be included as an explanatory variable in the structural 
equation for y1; y1, in turn, is an explanatory variable in the structural equation of y2.  
Estimation of this system of equations is possible, provided it is identified – i.e., rank and 
order conditions are met – using (inefficient) single equation methods (indirect least squares, 
two-stage least squares, or LIML) or (efficient) system methods (three-stage least squares, 
FIML).14 Most econometric textbooks contain detailed discussions of the estimation of 
systems of equations (e.g., Greene, 2000). 
In conclusion, we support Heckman’s (2000) suggestion that it is sensible to think of 
endogeneity as the case where the ceteris paribus condition does not hold while manipulating 
one of the explanatory variables. Sources of endogeneity include omitted variables and 
simultaneity. Potential solutions for endogeneity following from both causes are available, but 
their success in applied settings varies greatly. 
3.  Omitted variables in the relation between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure 
The previous section emphasized two main sources of endogeneity bias: (1) 
correlated omitted variables and (2) simultaneity. We will concentrate in the remainder of this 
paper on the first source because earlier literature has already investigated simultaneity bias in 
                                                     
14 The tradeoff between single equation and system methods is that the latter are more susceptible to 
misspecification since they require the correct specification of all equations in the system. As an 
equivalent alternative one may estimate the reduced form of the structural model and then solve for the 
structural parameters in terms of reduced form parameters.  
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the relation between cost-of-capital and disclosure (Welker, 1995; Hail, 2002) and found that 
simultaneity bias does not appear to invalidate the results of OLS estimation.15 
We first discuss (1) costs of disclosure16 and (2) management reputation17 as 
examples of unobservable firm characteristics that are likely correlated with disclosure and 
relatively fixed over time.  Next, we review the literature in search of joint, observable 
determinants of both disclosure and cost-of-debt capital that were omitted in Sengupta (1998).  
Unobservable firm characteristics 
 Costs of disclosure. While it is likely that the direct costs of disclosure (gathering and 
reporting information) differ between firms, some recent papers have focussed on a 
potentially interesting source of firm heterogeneity, i.e., the costs associated with investor 
uncertainty about the disclosure of information (Verrecchia, 2001). This uncertainty can 
originate from differences in technical expertise to understand the disclosure among the 
firm’s investors (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003) or because it is unclear whether withholding 
disclosure results from firms having no information or having unfavourable information (Dye, 
1985, 1998; Jung and Kwon, 1988). Whatever its origin, these models suggests that the extent 
of uncertainty affects the optimal disclosure policy of the firm. Intuitively, the firm may 
benefit from uncertainty because (unsophisticated) investors cannot distinguish between the 
two reasons for withholding information and, as a result, such investors may over value the 
firm.18 The idea that investors differ in terms of their sophistication has found general 
                                                     
15 We choose a research design that allows us to investigate endogeneity caused by omitted variables in 
relative isolation from endogeneity caused by simultaneity. We provide more details on this in Section 
4. In short, we rely on the pre-determinedness of most of our RHS variables to argue that simultaneity 
is less likely to be severe. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that simultaneity bias is 
present and our results should be interpreted with this caution in mind. One possible explanation why 
these earlier studies have not found that OLS is inconsistent might be that the instrument variables that 
were used in prior work were weak (see also, Larcker and Rusticus, 2005)  
16 Recent studies have pointed explicitly to the failure of many disclosure studies to take between-firm 
differences in costs of disclosure into account (Fields et al., 2001; Cohen, 2003). 
17 We would like to stress that these are indeed examples and many other reasonable theories exist. 
Agency costs are a clear alternative illustration. These costs are unobservable but likely differ among 
firms. Agency costs are likely to affect both the disclosure decision and the cost-of-capital. Yet another 
alternative is firm (as opposed to management) reputation. We do not aim at providing an exhaustive 
list of firm heterogeneity.  
18 See Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) for a model in which pro forma disclosures are used to misdirect the 
attention of investors with limited cognitive abilities. To the extent that cognitive abilities among 
investors vary we expect different optimal levels of disclosure. 
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recognition in the empirical literature (Hand, 1990). Usually, sophistication is proxied by the 
proportion of institutional investors. Several papers document how capital market reactions 
differ depending on the composition of the firm’s investor base (Kim et al., 1997; Walther, 
1997, Bartov et al. 2000). Thus, the uncertainty of firms about the way the market will react 
to their disclosures is likely to differ. Not only will this uncertainty affect the optimal 
disclosure, but it will also affect cost-of-capital. Given that investors are uncertain about the 
nature of non-disclosure they need to be compensated in expected return. Therefore, both 
disclosure and costs of capital are affected by the unobservable firm-specific characteristic of 
the sophistication of investors. 
 Management reputation. Disclosure has been modelled as a device through which 
managers signal their talent (Trueman, 1986; Healy and Palepu, 2001). The reasoning usually 
is that more talented managers will reveal their type through making voluntary disclosures, 
although Nagar (1999) offers a model in which even talented managers may opt for non-
disclosure in some cases. This author assumes that managers are differently talented and that 
they are uncertain about the market’s response to the disclosure of their performance. 
Depending on the extent of the penalty the market puts on non-disclosing performance and 
the manager’s discomfort from the uncertainty about the market’s reaction to disclosure, the 
optimal disclosure policy will vary. Regardless of the supposed chain of events, managerial 
talent or discomfort are unobservable sources of firm heterogeneity.    
It seems very likely that a manager’s talent also affects the cost-of-debt capital. For 
example, more talented managers might make more persuasive propositions when seeking 
debt capital. Investors will consider the default risk of firms managed by talented managers to 
be lower. Their road shows should be more interesting to investors and they might attract 
bigger crowds eager to jump on the bandwagon of a talented manager and his or her firm. In 
sum, both cost-of-debt capital and disclosure are influenced by the manager’s talent, and 
talent is likely to differ between firms but is also relatively constant over time in any one firm.  
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Joint determinants of disclosure and cost-of-debt capital 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest three categories of variables that will impact on 
the disclosure decision (1) performance variables, (2) structure variables, and (3) offer 
variables. These categories are motivated by theoretical arguments in which disclosing 
information reduces adverse selection problems between investor and firm, decreases 
transaction costs associated with trading on capital markets and limits potential litigation 
costs caused by withholding information relevant to investors. Each of these variables will 
likely also affect the firm’s cost-of-debt capital. We will briefly discuss each category in turn 
and indicate its effect on disclosure and cost of capital. 
It is well recognized that performance is related to disclosure, albeit that the exact 
nature of the relation between the two is complex (Miller, 2002). Some theoretical models 
(e.g., Verrecchia, 1983 and Lanen and Verrecchia, 1987) suggest that firms will withhold 
negative news but disclose positive news, a concern that is often voiced by regulators as well 
(see, e.g., Levitt, 1998). The empirical evidence so far is not consistent with these 
contentions, as some authors have shown that bad news is rushed forward to avoid legal 
action (Skinner, 1994, 1997), to warn investors about earnings disappointments (Kasznik and 
Lev, 1995) or to improve the conditions surrounding stock option grants (Aboody and 
Kasznik, 2000). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that disclosure is associated with 
performance. 
Firms that perform well are likely to meet more favourable conditions when vying for 
capital. Investors perceive firms with sustained superior performance as less risky or they 
attribute better prospects to these firms. Performance will therefore be negatively associated 
with the cost-of-debt capital. 
Structure variables refer to the economies of scale in producing information and to 
the extent of information asymmetry between investors and firm. One structural variable is 
the size of the firm; the idea is that larger firms will have comparatively lower (accounting) 
costs to produce the same amount information than smaller firms. Larger firms will thus 
disclose more information. 
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The adverse selection problem between the firm and its investors will be larger when 
information asymmetry between the two parties is greater (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Dye, 
2001; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Since disclosure is an instrument to reduce 
information asymmetry, disclosure will be more extensive when information asymmetry 
(prior to disclosure) is perceived to be substantial. 
As large firms are generally thought to be less risky, size is expected to be negatively 
associated with cost-of-debt capital (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). Similarly, information 
asymmetry increases the (default) risk an investor is exposed to when providing capital to a 
company (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). The cost-of-capital is 
therefore increasing in the extent of information asymmetry. 
Finally, the last category of factors that impact on the disclosure decision refers to the 
offer variable. Theory suggests that managers who consider making capital market 
transactions have incentives to disclose information to reduce information asymmetry 
problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) and Healy et al. 
(1999) find evidence consistent with this idea for equity and debt offerings, respectively and 
Frankel et al. (1995) for both.19   
The extent of a firm’s capital market transactions may also affect its cost-of-capital 
because the market may interpret the frequency of these transactions as a signal about the 
firm’s performance (Myers and Majluf, 1984). For example, frequent, sizable public debt 
issues may change the market’s assessment of the default risk of the firm. Offerings are 
therefore likely to be associated with the cost-of-debt. 
 In conclusion, we have described 1) some unobservable firm characteristics (costs of 
disclosure and management reputation) that are correlated with the firm’s disclosure policy 
and 2) joint determinants that are likely to impact on both disclosure and cost-of-capital. 
When omitted from the analysis of the relation between cost-of-capital and disclosure, the 
                                                     
19 Lang and Lundholm (2000) on the other hand provide evidence that increasing disclosure prior to a 
seasoned equity offering may be interpreted as ‘hyping’ the stock and firms experience continued 
negative returns subsequent to the offering announcement. This effect is probably difficult to witness in 
our sample since we do not have a continuous measure of disclosure policy, but instead rely on annual 
assessments of disclosure. See also, Jog and McConomy (2003) and Mak (1996) 
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results are likely to be misleading. In the following sections, we document the severity of the 
bias in analyses that do not incorporate unobservable firm characteristics or joint determinants 
of disclosure and cost-of-capital and suggest a methodology to mitigate the bias.  
 3. Research design and variable definitions  
 We start the analysis by replicating Sengupta’s (1998) results on the relation between 
disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. Specifically, we estimate the following regression 
equation using Ordinary Least Squares: 
(1)                            11 itiiitit ControlDisclosureInterceptYIELD εββ +++= +  
where  
YIELD = The effective yield to maturity at the moment of a public bond issue. This 
is our measure of the cost-of-debt capital. Yield to maturity is defined as the 
discount rate that equates the current value of all future interest and principal 
payments to the capital provided by the lender at the moment of the bond 
issue. 
Disclosure = Joint label for our four measures of corporate disclosure policy: (1) 
PCTRNK, the percentage rank of overall corporate disclosure policy, (2) 
PCTREL, the percentage rank of investor relations disclosure policy, (3) 
PCTANL, the percentage rank of disclosure through the firm’s annual report 
and (4) PCTOPB, the percentage rank of quarterly and other publications 
disclosures. Percentage ranks are constructed from the assessment of 
corporate disclosure policy by the AIMR Corporate Information Committee 
in their Annual Reviews of Corporate Reporting Practices.20 Percentage ranks 
for each disclosure measure are computed by ranking each firm from 1 to N 
within each industry, such that N is assigned to the firm with the highest 
AIMR disclosure score, etc. Subsequently, each firm’s rank is divided by the 
total number of firms rated within its industry to obtain the percentage ranks. 
                                                     
20 These ratings have been frequently used in earlier disclosure studies and are discussed in some detail 
elsewhere (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001). 
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Control = These measures include leverage, coverage of interest expense, return-on-
sales, the log of total assets, volatility of firm performance, the size of the 
bond issue, the issue’s time to maturity, the call option properties of the 
security, the interest on constant maturity US treasury bills, the time-series 
variation in risk premium over that contained in treasure bills, and dummy 
variables for convertible bonds and subordinate debt. These controls intend to 
take into account firm and issue specific factors as well as macroeconomic 
circumstances. For brevity we refer the reader to Sengupta (1998) for a 
further justification of their inclusion in the analysis. Appendix A provides 
measurement details. Since it is our purpose to replicate Sengupta’s findings 
and then investigate the potential endogeneity bias in the relation between 
cost-of-debt capital and disclosure, we defer discussion of these control 
variables.  
 The time subscripts are of importance. We measure cost-of-debt capital at t+1, while 
Disclosure and all control variables that are not bond issue specific are measured at t. We can 
therefore consider these right hand side variables as predetermined; although these variables 
may be contemporaneously (at t) determined jointly, with regard to future values (t+1) of 
cost-of debt capital they may be regarded as having already been determined (Greene, 2000). 
This is a common method to make plausible that innovations in the dependent variable are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (i.e., to reduce the likelihood of simultaneity 
bias). Bond-issue specific controls are not predetermined and we cannot exclude the 
possibility that they are endogenous. Moreover, to the extent that autocorrelation is present, 
we can no longer assume that the disturbance term is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. Results should be interpreted with this possibility in mind. 
Next, we evaluate the importance of the first source of endogeneity bias in the OLS 
regression of Equation (1), i.e., the impact of omitted variables known to be a determinant of 
both cost-of-debt capital and disclosure policy. For this purpose, we augment Equation (1) 
with variables that intend to capture those categories listed in Lang and Lundholm (1993) and 
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summarized above as joint determinants of disclosure policy and cost-of-capital. Specifically, 
we estimate the following equation using OLS:  















GROWTH  = Average future growth in sales (item #12) between t+1 and t+3. 
FROS = Average future return-on-sales (as defined earlier) between t+1 and 
t+3. 
LOSS = Dummy variable that is unity for firms with negative current net 
income (item #18), and zero otherwise. 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio at the end of the year, defined as market value 
of equity (item #24×item #25) divided by the book value of equity 
(item #60).  
FROS×GROWTH = Interaction term between future return-on-sales and future growth 
rate. We include this variable to capture the potentially non-linear 
relation between performance and disclosure as suggested in Miller 
(2002). Before computing the interaction between FROS and 




CAPEXP = Capital expenditures in the current year (item #128) scaled by total 
assets (item #6). This variable captures information asymmetry about 
                                                     
21 Sengupta (1998) includes two variables as control variables in his regression that would otherwise 
have been included into this category. These variables (current income and interest coverage) are 
therefore part of the specification of our Equation 1 as ROS and COVER, respectively.  
22 Sengupta (1998) includes the logarithm of total assets as a control variable in his regression. This 
variable (LASSETS) was therefore included as control in our Equation 1. Otherwise, it would have 
been included in the category of structure variables to proxy for the economies of scale in producing 
information. 
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the firm’s strategy and, in particular about its investment 
opportunities. 
MOODRNK = Moody’s ranking of the firm’s bond. MOODRNK equals 100 if the 
bond is rated A1 by Moody’s and 1 if the bond has rating Caa1. 
MOODRNK declines linearly from 100 to 1. We include 
MOODRNK as a proxy for amount of information asymmetry 
between the firm and its investors. The idea is that high levels of 
information asymmetry will make the firm’s securities more risky 
and will prompt Moody’s to downgrade the firm’s ranking (see, e.g., 
Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Ziebart and Reiter, 1992; Kaplan and 
Urwitz, 1979; Fisher, 1959).23 
 
Offer variable: 
ISSUES = Number of bond issues by firm i in the current year. 
 
If omitted variables are a source of endogeneity bias in Equation (1) then including 
the variables described above will reduce the amount of bias and OLS estimation of the 
augmented equation should be consistent (in the absence of firm heterogeneity effects). 
Therefore we document changes in the coefficient estimate on Disclosure in Equations (1) 
and (2) to evaluate the extent of the endogeneity bias caused by omitted variables. 
                                                     
23 The inclusion of MOODRNK as a determinant of cost-of-debt capital is contentious. While some 
prior studies have added credit ratings as a control variable (Mansi et al., 2003; Campbell and Taksler, 
2003; Bagnani et al., 1994), other have not. Sengupta (1998) argues that credit rating agencies consider 
the quality of disclosure when deciding on a firm’s credit rating. Including the rating alongside a 
measure of disclosure may therefore create multicollinearity problems and it might become difficult to 
separate out the effects of disclosure and of credit ratings. We decided to include MOODRNK not only 
because it is an established proxy of information asymmetry, but also because we believe it is 
important to try to establish if the market reacts to disclosure directly or to credit ratings which 
(indirectly) reflect disclosure quality. We have also conducted the empirical analyses without 
MOODRNK and we report these results in footnote 32. If MOODRNK is construed as a proxy for 
information asymmetry then a more appropriate measurement is before the firm discloses its 
information. Since MOODRNK is an issue-specific rating, it is not straightforward to implement this in 
the regressions. We check the robustness of our results to the timing of the measurement of information 
asymmetry by replacing MOODRNK by S&P long term debt rating (Compustat item 280), which is 
available for all firm-years in the sample. We use a lagged (t-1) value of this rating to ensure that it is 
measured before the disclosure at t. We report the results for this specification in footnote 32 as well. 
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Finally, we investigate both sources of endogeneity bias simultaneously. We use 
panel data techniques (fixed effects) 24 to estimate the following equation:  














 iα  = Any unobservable firm-specific variable that remains fixed over time, and all other 
variables are as defined above. 
Since the firm-specific variable iα  is assumed to remain constant, an alternative 
approach to fixed effects estimation is to re-specify Equation (3) in first differences and 
estimate it with OLS.  Differencing provides researchers with an easy to implement solution 
to the heterogeneity bias (Wooldridge, 2002). Taking differences in Equation (3) will cause 
the firm-specific variable iα to drop out of the equation. Note that differencing requires at 
least two consecutive years of data for each firm. We use first-differences estimation as a 
robustness check on our fixed effects findings. 
Finally, we provide further evidence on the nature of the correlation, which theory 
suggests exists between Disclosure (as well as other independent variables) and the firm 
heterogeneity variable iα using a procedure suggested by Mundlak (1978).  We provide a 
brief and informal description of Mundlak’s (1978) approach in Appendix B. Combined, the 
results for Equations 1-3 provide us with evidence on the magnitude of endogeneity bias 
caused by firm-specific heterogeneity and omitted variables. Note that while we focus on the 
effect of endogeneity on the coefficient on Disclosure, any of the RHS variables may 
                                                     
24 In principle, Equation (3) could be estimated using fixed and random effects, respectively. The 
appropriateness of each estimator depends on assumptions about the correlation between αi and the 
included independent variables. If the firm-specific characteristics captured in αi are independent of the 
regressors, random effects estimation is consistent and efficient. However, if the firm-specific 
characteristics are correlated with any of the regressors this estimation procedure is inconsistent and 
fixed effects is preferred. Since we have strong theoretical reasons to believe that firm-specific 
characteristics are correlated with the disclosure variable, our priors are that fixed effects estimation is 
the most appropriate when estimating Equation 3.  In fact, unreported results of a Hausman test of the 
consistency of random and fixed effects estimation support the choice for fixed effects. This is further 
evidence that firm heterogeneity is important in the current setting and should be taken into account 
(using fixed effects) when estimating the relation between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. 
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(potentially) be correlated with the error term in the structural equation, and thus be 
endogenous. In fact, we show below this to be the case for CALL and RISK. To the extent 
that endogeneity is caused by time-invariant firm heterogeneity, the fixed effects estimation 
will alleviate the bias in all RHS variables.  
Caveats.  
The use of panel data techniques (especially, fixed effects or differencing) when 
multiple observations of a firm over time are available has become pervasive practice in the 
economics and finance literatures, although accounting researchers have been somewhat slow 
to emulate the example. This literature strongly demonstrates the importance of controlling 
for unobservable firm (or economic agent) heterogeneity in many settings.25 Fixed effects 
estimation will, however, not always be successful in mitigating the problem of unobserved 
firm heterogeneity. Zhou (2001), for example, draws attention to the observation that if the 
relation under study is essentially a cross-sectional phenomenon, fixed effects estimation will 
not be effective. Indeed, since fixed effects estimation removes all cross-sectional (between) 
variation, one of its underlying assumptions is that over-time changes within each firm are 
driving the relation of interest. In the context of our setting, we need to establish that 
disclosure quality changes substantially over time for individual firms and that it is this within 
variation that impacts on cost-of-debt capital. Changes in disclosure should be indicative of 
substantive changes in disclosure policy. The next section provides evidence to underpin the 
validity of using fixed effects in our context.26 
4. Sample and summary statistics 
                                                     
25 Seminal studies include Mundlak (1961, 1978), Hoch (1962), Ben-Porath (1973), Griliches (1977), 
Ashenfelter (1978), Chamberlain (1978), Hausman (1978), Hausman and Taylor (1981). More recent 
applications in finance include Doidge (2004), Campbell and Taksler (2003), Himmelberg et al. (1999), 
Ashenfelter and Kruger (1994). In accounting, Francis et al. (2004), Hail and Leuz (2004) provide 
fixed effect results. 
26 Zhou (2001), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Griliches and Hausman (1986) note that the fixed effect 
estimator may suffer from bias, which is associated with measurement error. Griliches and Hausman 
(1986) point out that measurement error will have a different impact on the fixed effects estimator and 
the first-differences estimator. Since we report fixed effects and first-differences results that are very 
close, it is unlikely that measurement error is a major issue here.  
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 The sample comprises 358 firm-year observations from 100 firms during 1986-
1996.27 To be included in the sample, the firm needs to fulfil the following criteria: (1) public 
debt is issued during the sample period and data on yield-to-maturity and other issue 
characteristics are available on the SDC Platinum Database, (2) the firm’s disclosure policy is 
rated by the AIMR, (3) accounting data is available on the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged 
Database and (4) future sales and earnings data is available to compute FROS and GROWTH. 
We excluded 80 firms with only one observation in the sample due to the requirements of the 
panel data techniques and we deleted firms in the financial industry. Table 1 documents the 
effect of each of the sample filters and breaks down the sample by year and by industry.  The 
data necessary to compute the variables TBILL and RISKPR are taken from the Federal 
Reserve Database (FREDII). 
 Table 2 contains sample summary statistics. The average (median) value of our cost-
of-debt capital measure [YIELD] is 8.14 (8.07), which is similar to Sengupta’s (1998) 
findings. The average percentage rank of disclosure is (for all four measures) just above 0.5, 
indicating that our sample firms disclose more information than the average firm in their 
industry. The standard deviation of each disclosure score is about 0.27, which indicates that 
we have substantial disclosure variation in our sample. AIMR’s disclosure ratings tend to 
focus on larger and better known firms. This bias is reflected in our sample since sample 
firms are large (mean (median) of total assets is $9.81($7.80) billion). Our sample is less 
skewed than Sengupta’s who reports a mean (median) value of total assets of $10.1 ($6.02) 
billion.  
 Table 3 reports Pearson correlations (below the diagonal) and their p-values (above 
the diagonal). YIELD is significantly, negatively associated with three disclosure measures 
and negatively, but not significantly with the measure PCTOPB. The three specific disclosure 
                                                     
27 Sengupta’s (1998) sample consists of 103 observations (and as many firms, since he only retains one 
observations per firm). We have, due to our design, multiple observations for each firm, and 
consequently cannot claim that our observations are independent. To ascertain the extent of this 
problem we have compiled a sample in which each firm enters only once, and ran the benchmark 
model on this sample. Our results remained qualitatively unchanged and we conclude that any potential 
downward bias of the standard errors, due to dependent observations, is likely to be minor.   
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measures (PCTREL, PCTANL and PCTOPB) are positively and significantly associated with 
the overall measure of disclosure (PCTRNK), which suggests that disclosure practices via 
investor relations, the annual report and other publications are complementary.  
 We mentioned in the previous section that substantial over-time variation in each 
firm’s disclosure quality is a precondition for applying fixed effects estimation. We conduct a 
first analysis of whether our sample fulfils this precondition in Table 4. The table contains the 
year-to-year transition probabilities matrix, which shows the probability of a firm moving 
from decile i in year t (shown in the first column) to decile j in year t+1 (shown in the first 
row). Panel A contains the transition matrix for entire AIMR sample (1986-1996). Panel B 
contains the transition matrix for our final sample.  The findings suggest that the final sample 
is representative of the entire AIMR population. More importantly, the probability of staying 
in the same disclosure quality category from year to year generally does not exceed 25% 
(diagonal entries in each panel). Therefore, about 75% of firms either improve or worsen their 
disclosure over time. It would seem that the within variation is substantial and fixed effects 
estimation should be appropriate in the current setting. We address the requirement of 
substantial over-time variation in the firm’s disclosure quality further in the Additional 
Analysis section. 
5. Results 
Benchmark model. Table 5 contains the results from pooled OLS regressions of Equation (1) 
for each of the four measures of Disclosure. These regressions replicate and extend 
Sengupta’s original analysis. As in Sengupta (1998, Table 6)28, we find a negative and 
strongly significant association (coefficient=-0.33, s.e.=0.12)29 between the measure of 
overall disclosure policy (PCTRNK) and cost-of-debt capital. We also consistently find 
negative and significant associations between the three other measures of Disclosure 
(PCTREL, PCTANL and PCTOPB) and cost-of-debt capital.  Note that this finding is 
somewhat in contrast with Botosan and Plumlee (2002) who report that the sign of the 
                                                     
28 Note that the magnitudes of our coefficients are not directly comparable to those in Sengupta (1999) 
because our variable definitions are sometimes different.  
29 Standard errors throughout the paper are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent.  
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relation between disclosure and cost-of-capital is conditional on the type of disclosure (i.e., 
through investor relations, the annual report or other publications). Although not the focus of 
our attention, we find that most control variables are significant in all four regressions and 
have the same sign as in Sengupta (1998). Together the independent variables have good 
explanatory power; the adjusted R-squared is about 84%. 
Main findings. We investigate the endogeneity bias caused by omitted ‘joint determinants’ in 
Tables 6 through 8. Recall that our claim is that Sengupta’s model omits several variables 
theory suggests are correlated with both disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. We first evaluate 
whether these ‘joint determinants’ are indeed associated with Disclosure in Table 6 – Panel 
A. We report on regressions of each of our four Disclosure measures on those variables 
suggested in earlier literature, including Performance, Structure and Offer variables. The 
results show that all joint determinants (except for LOSS, LASSET and MTB) are 
significantly associated with our overall measure of Disclosure, PCTRNK. Although the 
results for the other three measures (PCTREL, PCTANL and PCTOPB) are somewhat mixed, 
we conclude that the complete set of variables has significant explanatory power for each 
Disclosure measure.30 Table 5 – Panel B shows the results of an ANOVA analysis of the four 
Disclosure measures. We find that allowing firm-specific intercepts to explain disclosure 
accounts for much more of the variation in each of the Disclosure measures than our complete 
set of ‘joint determinants’ (the adjusted R-squared in the ANOVA analysis averages about 
60% versus 9% in the regressions of Panel A). Our interpretation of this finding is that 
unobserved firm-specific factors are a very important consideration in explaining differences 
in disclosure policy. In addition, these results indicate that augmenting the benchmark model 
with the joint determinants alone may not suffice to eliminate the endogeneity bias in the 
results, if in fact unobserved firm heterogeneity is correlated with cost-of-debt capital.  
 Table 7 contains the results of the OLS estimation of the augmented Sengupta model, 
Equation (2) for each of the four Disclosure measures. These regressions only attempt to 
                                                     
30 The simple correlations in Table 2 between each of the ‘joint determinants’ (and their best linear 
combination) and our disclosure variables are low and there is little reason to be concerned about 
multicollinearity being an issue in our subsequent analyses (see also Griffiths et al. 1993). 
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mitigate the endogeneity bias caused by omitted joint determinants. The Performance, 
Structure and Offer variables we included based on the extant literature are generally 
associated with cost-of-debt capital. The weakest results are obtained for FROS, the 
interaction FROS*GR, CAPEXP and ISSUES, which do not obtain significance in any of the 
four regressions. However, GROWTH, MTB and MOODRNK (LOSS) are strongly 
(marginally) associated with cost-of-debt capital. An F-test on the incremental explanatory 
power of all Performance, Structure and Offer variables together suggests that these variables 
are helpful in explaining cost-of-debt capital (in the overall disclosure measure regression, 
PCTRNK, F=10.31, p-value<1%)31. We find that Disclosure and cost-of-debt capital are no 
longer significantly associated once these ‘joint determinants’ are included in the regression. 
Note that the loss of significance is due to a reduced magnitude of the OLS coefficient on 
Disclosure compared with Equation (1) and not because of an increase in the standard errors 
and thus lack of power.  From comparing these results with those of Equation (1), it would 
seem that in the latter equation Disclosure subsumes part of the effect of the joint 
determinants on cost-of-debt capital, which results in an upward bias of the coefficient on 
Disclosure in Sengupta’s original model.32 
Table 8 contains the findings for the fixed effects estimation of the augmented 
Sengupta model, i.e., Equation (3) for each of the Disclosure measures.33 These regressions 
attempt to simultaneously control for firm-specific heterogeneity bias and for endogeneity 
caused by omitted variables. The findings are consistent throughout the table. Cost-of-debt 
capital is strongly negatively associated with disclosure policy at the level of the individual 
firm. The coefficient estimates range between -0.22 and -0.40 for each of the four Disclosure 
measures.  In particular, we find that the fixed effect coefficient in Equation (3) on PCTRNK 
is -0.40 (s.e.=0.13) compared with the OLS coefficient in Equation (1), which is –0.33. The 
                                                     
31 The (unreported) results for the other three disclosure measures are similar to those for PCTRNK. 
32 We also estimated the model without MOODRNK. Unreported results show that in the augmented 
OLS regressions Disclosure remains significant, but the size of the coefficient is smaller than in a 
model without any control variables included. Replacing MOODRNK by the lagged value of S&P’s 
long term debt rating did not affect the main findings and our conclusions remained unchanged. 
33 Random effects estimates for PCTREL, PCTANL and PCTOPB are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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implication is that the cost-of-debt capital benefit from increased disclosure is larger than 
previously reckoned. For a median size debt issue of $149.8 million, an improvement of 
disclosure score from the 25th to the 75th percentile, may reduce interest payments by about 
$10.4 million.34 
So far, while we have directly documented the effect of omitted ‘joint determinants’, 
we have only indirectly shown that unobservable firm-specific factors exist that are associated 
with both cost-of-debt capital and disclosure. When these unobservable factors remain 
unaccounted for, the disclosure variable will subsume part of their effect on cost-of-capital. In 
such case, the reported association between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure is a mixture of 
the true association between these variables and a spurious part due to not accounting 
properly for unobservable firm-specific factors. We use Mundlak’s (1978) approach to 
investigate directly how unobservable firm-specific factors are associated with disclosure (or 
other independent variables). Table 10 holds the results of this analysis for all four Disclosure 
measures. We find that our measure of overall disclosure (PCTRNK), disclosure via investor 
relations (PCTREL), and marginally disclosure via annual reports (PCTANL) and other 
publications (PCTOPB) are positively associated with unobservable firm-specific factors.35 
Note that several of the control variables in Sengupta’s original model are also related with 
these firm-specific factors (especially, RISK and CALL), which reinforces the need for taking 
these effects into account when investigating the relation between cost-of-debt capital and 
disclosure. 
These results confirm the presence of endogeneity bias and imply that firms with 
higher cost-of-capital levels are also the firms that happen to disclose more information. This 
occurs not because disclosure is causally related to cost-of-capital, but because both variables 
                                                     
34 It should be noted, however, that the incremental explanatory power of the Disclosure variable is 
small (and below 1%). This is not unexpected though, since our model already explains almost 90% of 
the variation in cost-of-debt capital. What is more, the incremental explanatory power of Disclosure is 
of similar magnitude as our leverage variable, which is always very significant. Therefore, we believe 
that adding Disclosure to the model is meaningful regardless of its low incremental explanatory power. 
35 We also used feasible generalized least squares to estimate the relation between unobservable firm-
specific factors and disclosure and our results (not reported, but available on request) were qualitatively 
similar and did not change our conclusions.  
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are driven by omitted factors. The resulting endogeneity bias works against finding a relation 
in the cross-sectional OLS regressions we report in Table 7. As such, our results offer an 
explanation why some earlier studies fail to find a relation between cost-of-capital and 
disclosure. 
Based on these findings, we evaluate the bias in Sengupta’s model by comparing the 
fixed effects estimation of the coefficient on disclosure in Equation (3) with the OLS 
estimation of the same coefficient in Equation (1). While the difference between the two 
estimates is sizable at about 21%, this number does not fully convey the magnitude of the bias 
in Equation (1). Considering our earlier analyses together, the biases caused by firm 
heterogeneity and by omitted variables are of opposite sign, partially cancelling each other 
out in this specific setting.  
Additional Analyses. To show that our results do not depend on the specifics of fixed-effect 
estimation we also use OLS to estimate Equation (3) in first differences. The additional data 
requirement of two consecutive years of data reduces the number of firm-year observations to 
258. The results (reported in Table 9) show that the coefficient on each of our Disclosure 
measures is similar in magnitude to the fixed effects estimates. We also tested whether our 
results are sensitive to using unadjusted (‘raw’) AIMR disclosure scores and whether the 
relation between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital is different for firms that increase vs. 
decrease disclosure over time. Our results do not change when using raw disclosure scores36  
and we do not find differences for firms with increasing or decreasing over time disclosure.  
 Finally, we reported transition probabilities in Table 4 and argued that the amount of 
within-firm variation is sufficient to warrant fixed-effects analysis. At the same time, 
however, since many firms appear to be changing from one disclosure quality decile to 
another, these changes may not reflect the necessary substantial changes in disclosure policy. 
Theory (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001) emphasizes that cost-of-capital effects are mainly expected 
when a firm commits to a higher standard of disclosure (as opposed to a transitory change in 
disclosure quality in any given year). Any ex-ante commitment to a specific disclosure quality 
                                                     
36 Indeed, signs and significance remain similar in all cases except for the regressions of PCTANL. 
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will translate into a systematic component of disclosure quality and this component will be 
eliminated in the fixed effects estimation.37 If we were to take theory literally, we should not 
find a cost-of-debt capital effect after removing the systematic component of disclosure via 
fixed effects estimation. Our main findings, however, indicate that the changes in our 
Disclosure metric are such that they have a cost-of-debt capital effect. Our metric apparently 
captures substantial disclosure policy changes. On the other hand, since so many firms change 
disclosure policy (in Table 4), one might ask if this interpretation is reasonable. Sceptics may 
argue that if disclosure policy changes happen this often, ex-ante commitment is a rather 
hollow concept.38 We therefore consider next disclosure quality changes that are more 
exceptional (than movements to adjacent deciles) and which are more likely to capture 
disclosure policy changes. We conduct the following analyses to provide some evidence on 
this issue. We create disclosure quality deciles based on the sample of all AIMR firms (as in 
Table 4, Panel A). We then retain only those pairs of observations in the sample for which it 
is more likely that they reflect a change in the firm’s commitment to a disclosure policy.  
Specifically, we retain two consecutive observations if a firm is grouped in decile k first and 
subsequently is grouped in decile k ± i where i  2. Thus, the new sample contains only those 
observations where the firm ‘jumps’ over adjacent disclosure quality deciles. This restriction 
results is a final sample of 68 firms with 182 observations. We then run our main analysis 
again on this sample of firms with disclosure policy changes. Table 11 holds the details. As 
expected, we continue to find that disclosure policy affects the cost-of-debt capital. As before, 
OLS estimation of the augmented model produces an insignificant coefficient on Disclosure, 
but after adjusting for firm heterogeneity this coefficient is about twice larger than in the OLS 
                                                     
37 Indeed, this is precisely why we use fixed effects estimation. The decision to commit to a disclosure 
policy is likely to be part of a portfolio of simultaneous firm choices on strategy, business profile, risk 
and environmental segments, compensation, and customer/supplier relates policies (Core, 2001). As 
such, the systematic component is likely to be endogenous and should be eliminated from the analysis.  
38 One alternative explanation for our findings could be that our Disclosure measure captures mostly 
random noise or performance-related variation in disclosure quality (either because good performance 
leads to better disclosure or because its leads to better perceived disclosure). Noise will attenuate the 
regression coefficient, but the performance part can induce a negative relation between disclosure and 
cost-of-debt capital. While the performance control variables should control for this, the net effect 




regressions and strongly significant.  We conclude from this that our original findings are 
similar to the findings for a sample of firms for which we can be more certain that they 
changed their disclosure policy. Interpreting the original findings as evidence for what 
happens if a firm changes its commitment to a certain disclosure policy would, consequently, 
not seem unreasonable.  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 Theory prescribes the following steps to address endogeneity. First, researchers 
should develop a theoretical model for the choice being examined. Next, researchers should 
determine which variables are considered exogenous in the setting under study and a reduced 
form model should be derived. Given that the model is identified, the reduced form can be 
estimated and the structural parameters can be recovered. This prescription appears to be 
ignored in many empirical studies. In particular, the requirement to formulate explicitly the 
underlying model for the choice being examined is, in our observation, seldom met in 
practice.  Such model does not have to be formal, but should be based on a rigorous survey of 
what is known about the choice under investigation. Only once the underlying model is made 
explicit can the econometric properties of the estimated results be understood. 
We argue that our understanding of the relation between cost-of-capital and 
disclosure is precarious because of the existence of an endogeneity bias in extant work. We 
investigate two important sources of endogeneity bias, (1) unobservable firm heterogeneity 
and (2) observable omitted variables. Theory suggests that firm heterogeneity may arise due 
to differences in costs of disclosure between firms or because management reputation varies 
among firms. Cost of disclosure as well as management reputation impacts on both cost-of-
debt capital and disclosure. Neither is directly observable to the researcher and when omitted 
from the empirical analysis causes endogeneity bias. Earlier empirical and theoretical work 
has suggested that variables reflecting firm performance, structure and offerings are related to 
disclosure policy. These variables also affect cost-of-debt capital. Similar as before, when 
omitting these variables from the analysis an endogeneity bias is likely to arise.  
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 We investigated how each of these two endogeneity biases affect the estimation of the 
relation between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure and documented substantial effects for 
both, albeit that firm heterogeneity appears to be the more important one. It also appears that 
in the current setting the two sources of bias are of opposite sign, which makes the net effect 
underestimate the true magnitude of the bias. We further investigate firm heterogeneity and 
show that disclosure is positively and significantly associated with unobservable firm-specific 
factors that cause heterogeneity. This reinforces our claim that the association between 
disclosure and cost-of-debt capital is partially driven by the disclosure variable reflecting 
omitted firm-specific factors. 
We attempt to mitigate endogeneity bias by relying on theory to identify additional 
variables correlated with both disclosure and cost-of-debt capital and by applying fixed 
effects estimation. Fixed effects estimation is only expected to be helpful if the relation of 
interest between two variables is driven by changes over time within the firm. The relation 
under investigation should not be a cross-sectional phenomenon, since between variation is 
eliminated in the fixed effects approach. Empirically, we show that in our setting over-time 
changes in firm disclosure are substantial, which speaks to the fact that the relation between 
disclosure and cost-of-debt capital is surely not just a cross-sectional attribute.  This finding is 
substantiated by the results of the fixed effects estimation, which demonstrate that after 
removal of the cross-sectional variation, a strong association exists between disclosure and 
cost-of debt capital. Implicitly, fixed effects estimation assumes that the changes in our 
disclosure measure are an indication of substantive changes in disclosure policy. Some 
theoretical studies suggest that cost-of-capital effects are expected to be most strongly when a 
firm commits to a certain level of disclosure ex ante. Since such commitment would lead to a 
relatively constant level of disclosure over time for any one firm, its effect would be 
subsumed by the variable iα  and drop out in the fixed effects estimation. In contrast, we 
established a strong relation between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure in the fixed effects 
estimation which is consistent with (1) changes in our disclosure measure being indicative of 
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substantive changes in (ex ante commitment to) disclosure policy – and therefore not 
subsumed in iα , or (2) changes in disclosure matter even after controlling for a firm’s overall 
ex ante commitment to a specific level of disclosure.  The latter explanation assumes that ex 
ante commitment to disclosure is not the only way to obtain cost-of-capital effects (see for a 
similar opinion: Dye, 2001). Earlier empirical work seems to concur. Healy et al. (1999) and 
Lundholm and Myers (2002), for example, show that changes in disclosures impact on stock 
return and stock liquidity. While we readily concede that the burden of proof is on the 
researcher to make sure that fixed effect estimation is appropriate in a specific setting to 
address endogeneity, we also believe that in our setting it clearly is a helpful method to 
mitigate at least some of endogeneity’s confounding effects.  
Based on our findings, we recommend that researchers collect multiple observations 
for each firm in their sample and use either a first-differences specification and OLS or fixed 
effects estimation to address the endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital 
and disclosure. Without explicitly accounting for endogeneity in this relation, any causal 
inference is likely to be fraught with problems. 
Some may argue that using fixed effects estimation to address endogeneity in this or 
other settings is too simple a solution for a complex problem. Perhaps this is true, but at a 
minimum researchers should be warned that some concern is warranted if they find that OLS 
results change dramatically after the inclusion of fixed-effects. If nothing else, fixed effects 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions. 
YIELD = The effective yield to maturity at the moment of bond issue. 
PCTRNK = The percentage rank of overall corporate disclosure policy. 
PCTREL = The percentage rank of investor relations disclosure policy. 
PCTANL = The percentage rank of disclosure through the firm’s annual report. 
PCTOPB = The percentage rank of quarterly and other publications disclosures.  
GROWTH = Average future growth in sales (item #12) between t+1 and t+3. 
FROS  = Average future return-on-sales (see, below) between t+1 and t+3. 
LOSS = Dummy variable that is unity for firms with negative current net income 
(item #18), and zero otherwise. 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio at the end of the year, defined as market value of 
equity (item #24×item #25) divided by the book value of equity (item #60).  
FROS×GROWTH = Interaction term between future return-on-sales and future growth 
rate.  
CAPEXP = Capital expenditures in the current year (item #128) scaled by total assets 
(item #6).  
MOODRNK = Moody’s bond rating converted into the linear scale. 
ISSUES = Number of bond issues by firm i in the current year. 
LEV = Leverage, defined as long-term debt (Compustat item #9) divided by total 
assets (Compustat item#6). 
COVER = Coverage of interest expenses, a measure of the firm’s ability to meet its 
debt service requirements, computed as income before extraordinary items 
and interest expense (item#18+item #15) divided by interest expense (item 
#15). 
ROS = Return-on-Sales, as a measure of the firm’s operating performance, 
computed as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(item #13) divided by sales (item #12). 
ASSET = Total assets (item #6). 
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LASSET = Log of total assets, to proxy for the size of the firm. Computed as the 
logarithm of total assets (item #6). 
RISK = Volatility of the firm’s performance, defined as the firm’s highest stock 
price in year t (item #23) minus the firm’s lowest stock price in year t (item 
#22) divided by the end-of-year stock price (item #24). 
SIZE = Size of the bond issue in millions of dollars. This is the amount of capital 
received by the borrower. 
TTM  = Time to maturity. 
CALL = The callability of the security, ranging between zero and unity. It the bond 
is callable form the moment of issue CALL equals unity. CALL is zero for 
non-callable securities. CALL is computed as the bond’s maturity minus the 
time from the moment that the bond first becomes callable divided by the 
bond’s time to maturity. 
CONVER = Bond convertibility. Dummy variable that takes the value of unity if the 
bond is convertible and zero otherwise. 
SUBOR = Bond subordination. Dummy variable that takes the value of unity for 
subordinate debt and zero otherwise. 
TBILL = Interest on constant maturity US treasury bonds. These bonds are matched 
with treasury bills by maturity. A time weighted average is computed if the 
maturity of the bond does not match with that of the treasury bill.  
RISKPR = Measure of the time-series variation in risk premium over that contained in 
TBILL. Defined as the difference between the yield on a Moody’s Aaa bond 
and a treasury bill with 30 years maturity.  
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Appendix B. Mundlak’s (1978) approach 
In the random effects framework, a fundamental assumption is that the firm-specific 
effects are treated as strictly exogenous to present, future and past values of explanatory 
variables (Hsiao, 2003). Mundlak (1978) criticized the random effects specification precisely 
because there is usually very little reason to assume that firm-specific effects αi are 
uncorrelated with the regressors explicitly controlled for. If one neglects such correlation the 
inferences are incorrect. Mundlak (1978) relaxes the assumption of strict exogeneity by 
allowing the individual effects to depend linearly on the average values of individual-specific 
means of the explanatory variables. Specifically: 
][...11 Mxxy itikitkitit εαβββ +++++=  
][... ..11 regressionAuxiliaryxx ikikii ωκκα +++=  
where ..1 ,..., kii xx are average values of regressors for each individual i.  
The coefficients kκκ ,...,1 capture the extent of the correlation between the 
explanatory variable and the error term iα . Mundlak demonstrated that the GLS vector of 
coefficients ],...,[ 1 kκκ is equal to the following difference: 
withinbetween ββ ˆˆ − , where 
betweenβ̂ is a vector of slope coefficients from the regression where individual specific means 
in the dependent variable .iy  are regressed on the individual specific means in the 
independent variables ..1 ,..., kii xx ; and withinβ̂ is the Fixed Effects estimator. Moreover, 
Mundlak (1978) showed that GLS vector of coefficients in model M given the auxiliary 
regression equals the Fixed Effects estimator. On these grounds he claimed that there is only 
one correct estimator, which is the F.E. estimator.  
Under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity betweenβ̂  and withinβ̂  , are independent 
and it is easy to construct test statistics in order to test the significance of 


















Subsample # firms # of Obs. 
AIMR rated companies (1986-1996) 932 4705 
i. AIMR companies in COMPUSTAT/CRSP 778  
ii. AIMR rated companies that issued debt 508 1604 
i. and ii. Companies Merged (by year) 331 892 
Net of Non-Industrial companies 237 604 
After deletion of missing values 180 438 
Companies with more than one observation  100 358 
 
PANEL B 
Distribution of the Number of times a given firm appears in the sample 
# of times # Of Firms # of Obs. % 
2 35 70 19.6 
3 23 69 19.3 
4 17 68 19.0 
5 9 45 12.6 
6 9 54 15.1 
7 5 35 9.8 
8 1 8 2.2 
9 1 9 2.5 
Total: 100 358 100 
PANEL C 
Number of companies used in the analysis by year 
YEAR  # of Obs. % 
1986 17 4.75 
1987 13 3.63 
1988 26 7.26 
1989 29 8.10 
1990 68 18.99 
1991 52 14.53 
1992 52 14.53 
1993 19 5.31 
1994 35 9.78 
1995 32 8.94 
1996 15 4.19 
Total: 358 100.00 
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Number of companies used in the analysis by Industry 
INDUSTRY # of Firms # of Obs. % 
Aerospace 2 4 1.12 
Airline 4 17 4.75 
Apparel 1 7 1.96 
Chemical 4 16 4.47 
Construction 1 2 0.56 
Container and Packaging 2 4 1.12 
Diversified Companies 2 4 1.12 
Domestic Oil 5 14 3.91 
Electrical Equipment 4 11 3.07 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 17 48 13.41 
Health Care 9 35 9.78 
Independent Oil 2 5 1.40 
International Oil 1 5 1.40 
Machinery 3 13 3.63 
Natural Gas Distributors 2 9 2.51 
Natural Gas Pipeline 6 30 8.38 
Nonferrous and Mining 2 5 1.40 
Paper and Forest Products 12 47 13.13 
Precious Metals 1 2 0.56 
Publishing and Broadcasting 4 15 4.19 
Railroad 3 12 3.35 
Retail Trade 11 47 13.13 
Specialty Chemicals 1 4 1.12 
Textiles 1 2 0.56 





Table provides summary statistics for the variables used in subsequent analyses. The sample 
includes 100 companies, which amount to 358 firm-year observations. In order to avoid 
double counting we use only the first debt issue in a given year to measure YIELD. Bond 
attributes including YIELD are forwarded by one year since regressions use period t+1 debt 
issues when looking at period t disclosures. Disclosure score used to construct percentage 
rankings (PCTRNK, PCTREL, PCTANL, PCTOPB) are collected from AIMR-FAF reports 
over the period 1986-1996. The firm-level control variables are taken from 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged database; debt issues information is taken from SDC Platinum 




Variable Mean St. Dev. 75th pct Median 25th pct 
YIELD 8.138 1.331 9.125 8.065 7.105 
PCTRNK 0.578 0.284 0.824 0.632 0.375 
PCTREL 0.559 0.271 0.793 0.598 0.360 
PCTANL 0.571 0.278 0.806 0.618 0.375 
PCTOPB 0.548 0.285 0.800 0.585 0.308 
LEV 0.240 0.104 0.313 0.238 0.173 
COVER 4.372 5.340 4.925 2.952 1.868 
ROS 0.173 0.087 0.209 0.159 0.114 
ASSETS 9817 11766 12130 7801 3000 
LASSET 8.747 0.967 9.403 8.962 8.006 
RISK 0.394 0.172 0.458 0.361 0.275 
SIZE 179.2 123.5 225.0 149.8 99.7 
LMATUR 16.293 11.193 30.000 10.000 10.000 
CALL 0.174 0.308 0.300 0.000 0.000 
CONVER 0.036 0.187 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SUBOR 0.034 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TBILL 7.311 1.017 8.110 7.340 6.570 
RISKPR 0.669 0.126 0.760 0.650 0.590 
MOODRNK 72.302 28.236 94.737 84.211 36.842 
GROWTH 1.068 0.089 1.109 1.055 1.017 
FROS 0.170 0.085 0.211 0.158 0.110 
MTB 2.755 2.175 3.148 2.039 1.386 
CAPEXP 0.087 0.049 0.110 0.076 0.054 
FROSXGR 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.000 -0.002 
LOSS 0.056 0.230 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ISSUES 2.251  2.405 3.000 2.000 1.000 
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TABLE 3 
PEARSON CORRELATIONS (BELOW DIAGONAL) AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS (ABOVE DIAGONAL) 
Table reports Pearson correlations below the diagonal and their significance levels above the diagonal. Sample consists of 358 firm-year observations. See Appenidx 1 for variable definitions. 
  	
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YIELD  0.04 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.34 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.16 0.82 0.60 
PCTRNK -0.11  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.01 0.33 0.22 0.83 0.04 0.70 0.41 0.84 0.46 0.31 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.96 0.01 
PCTREL -0.09 0.74  0.00 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.24 0.01 0.33 0.76 1.00 0.34 0.40 0.63 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.27 0.00 
PCTANL -0.16 0.85 0.51  0.00 0.08 0.16 0.59 0.36 0.35 0.15 0.46 0.10 0.77 0.58 0.03 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.83 0.01 
PCTOPB -0.07 0.80 0.46 0.66  0.28 0.05 0.31 0.60 0.76 0.04 0.66 0.63 0.48 0.27 0.57 0.84 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.56 0.03 0.04 0.41 0.08 
LEV 0.18 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.06  0.00 0.15 0.88 0.08 0.89 0.37 0.94 0.16 0.79 0.97 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.01 
COVER -0.20 -0.14 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 -0.55  0.00 0.80 0.37 0.05 0.11 0.98 0.84 0.56 0.23 0.78 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.10 
ROS -0.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.23  0.04 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.80 0.87 0.40 0.21 0.81 0.92 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.30 
LASSET -0.07 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.11  0.00 0.00 0.61 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.21 0.12 0.01 
RISK 0.21 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.02 0.09 -0.05 -0.13 -0.21  0.39 0.93 0.35 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.44 0.80 
SIZE -0.05 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.41 -0.05  0.11 0.86 0.27 0.99 0.22 0.14 0.78 0.67 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.76 0.05 
LMATUR 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.03 0.00 0.09  0.00 0.53 0.30 0.03 0.52 0.57 0.01 0.57 0.65 0.14 0.01 0.46 0.20 
CALL 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.12 0.05 -0.01 0.39  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.42 0.90 0.79 0.29 0.14 0.59 0.80 0.52 0.04 
CONVER -0.24 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.24 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.40  0.00 0.02 0.34 0.03 0.11 0.80 0.75 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.06 
SUBOR -0.10 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.17 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.54  0.10 0.74 0.00 0.13 0.36 0.87 0.94 0.02 0.67 0.09 
TBILL 0.81 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 0.13 -0.07 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.09  0.00 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.99 0.05 0.13 
RISKPR 0.23 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.12 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.26  0.08 0.32 0.34 0.03 0.48 0.27 0.10 0.57 
MOODRNK -0.09 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.20 -0.35 0.14 -0.01 0.06 -0.14 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.12 -0.17 0.06 0.09  0.23 0.77 0.21 0.92 0.39 0.01 0.24 
GROWTH -0.20 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.11 -0.12 0.14 -0.08 -0.20 0.11 0.02 -0.14 0.01 0.09 0.08 -0.10 0.05 0.06  0.25 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.82 0.76 
FROS -0.20 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 0.23 0.91 -0.08 -0.16 -0.11 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06  0.00 0.04 0.32 0.01 0.11 
MTB -0.36 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.03 -0.24 0.47 0.16 0.09 -0.14 0.22 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.26 -0.11 0.07 0.22 0.23  0.51 0.26 0.25 0.53 
CAPEXP 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.09 0.17 -0.23 0.15 -0.14 -0.08 -0.03 0.14 0.00 0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.11 0.03  0.00 0.25 0.48 
FROSXGR 0.07 -0.16 -0.17 -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 0.11 -0.03 0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.14 -0.01 -0.19 -0.12 0.00 -0.06 0.05 -0.14 -0.05 -0.06 -0.24  0.22 0.75 
LOSS -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.21 -0.18 -0.20 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.14 0.01 -0.14 -0.06 -0.06 0.06  0.29 
ISSUES -0.03 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.13 -0.09 -0.06 0.36 -0.01 0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.06  
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TABLE  4 














Table contains the year-to-year transition probabilities matrix, which shows the probabilities of a firm moving from quantile i in year t 
(shown in the columns) to quantile j in year t+1 (shown in the rows). Panel A contains the transition matrix for the entire AIMR sample (1986-
1996), which includes only firms with at least two consecutive observations (3624 firm-years). Panel B contains transition matrix for our final 
sample with at least two consecutive observations (156 firms).  
Panel A: Entire AIMR sample (1986-1996) 
 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q 9 Q 10 All 
Q 1 0.45 0.22 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.00 
Q 2 0.24 0.31 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 1.00 
Q 3 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 1.00 
Q 4 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.03 1.00 
Q 5 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.03 1.00 
Q 6 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.04 1.00 
Q 7 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.07 1.00 
Q 8 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.11 1.00 
Q 9 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.22 1.00 
Q 10 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.46 1.00 
Panel B: Final sample (used to estimate our OLS/FE regressions) (1986-1996) 
Q 1 0.42 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Q 2 0.14 0.29 0.36 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Q 3 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Q 4 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Q 5 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.31 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.15 1.00 
Q 6 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Q 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.50 0.14 0.00 0.07 1.00 
Q 8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.21 0.26 0.16 1.00 
Q 9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.29 0.21 1.00 
Q 10 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.33 0.33 1.00 
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TABLE 5 
REPLICATION OF THE SENGUPTA’S FINDINGS FOR DIFFERENT DISCLOSURE MEASURES 
 
itkkitit ControlDisclosureInterceptYIELD εββ +++= + 11  
 
Table provides estimates for Equation (1) using pooled OLS regressions. The model is an equivalent of that estimated by Sengupta (1998). Column A of the table 
replicates Sengupta’s results using the measure of total disclosure quality (PCTRNK). The following three columns, respectively, use measures of quality of investor 
relations (PCTREL), annual reports (PCTANL), and quarterly and other publications (PCTOPB). All four measures of disclosure are constructed using AIMR-FAF 
disclosure scores for the period 1986-1996. The disclosure scores are converted to within industry percentage rankings in order to achieve better comparability across 
industries and over time: for each year and each industry the firms are ranked based upon disclosure score, then the rankings are divided by the number of firms being 
ranked. Sample includes 100 companies, which amount to 358 firm-year observations. In order to avoid double counting we use only first debt issue in a given year to 







Type of Discl.   (A) TOTAL RANK (PCTRNK) (B) INV. RELAT. (PCTREL) (C) ANNUAL (PCTANL) (D) OTHER PUBL. (PCTOPB) 
Variable Sign Coeff. St. Dev. P-value Coeff. St. Dev. P-value Coeff. St. Dev. P-value Coeff. St. Dev. P-value 
Disclosue - -0.332 0.122 [.007] -0.292 0.102 [.005] -0.318 0.133 [.017] -0.196 0.115 [.090] 
LEV + 2.170 0.338 [.000] 2.298 0.351 [.000] 2.174 0.337 [.000] 2.250 0.345 [.000] 
COVER - -0.015 0.006 [.011] -0.013 0.006 [.025] -0.014 0.006 [.020] -0.013 0.006 [.031] 
ROS - -0.706 0.396 [.075] -0.740 0.393 [.061] -0.705 0.401 [.080] -0.718 0.398 [.072] 
LASSET - -0.099 0.043 [.021] -0.098 0.043 [.024] -0.098 0.043 [.022] -0.102 0.043 [.018] 
SIZE + 0.001 0.000 [.025] 0.001 0.000 [.027] 0.001 0.000 [.031] 0.001 0.000 [.031] 
RISK + 0.732 0.215 [.001] 0.690 0.212 [.001] 0.756 0.222 [.001] 0.722 0.220 [.001] 
LMATUR + 0.000 0.003 [.880] 0.000 0.003 [.983] 0.000 0.003 [.965] 0.001 0.003 [.860] 
CALL + 0.353 0.138 [.011] 0.351 0.136 [.010] 0.373 0.143 [.010] 0.339 0.136 [.013] 
CONVER - -2.971 0.320 [.000] -2.983 0.326 [.000] -2.972 0.322 [.000] -2.960 0.333 [.000] 
SUBOR + 0.088 0.311 [.778] 0.102 0.317 [.748] 0.079 0.313 [.801] 0.082 0.327 [.803] 
TBILL + 1.069 0.028 [.000] 1.073 0.028 [.000] 1.063 0.029 [.000] 1.073 0.028 [.000] 
RISKPR + 0.395 0.273 [.150] 0.395 0.276 [.153] 0.405 0.274 [.139] 0.401 0.281 [.154] 
C   0.392 0.523 [.454] 0.313 0.512 [.542] 0.402 0.534 [.451] 0.286 0.502 [.569] 
                 
Adj-R2   0.848   0.847   0.848   0.845   





DETERMINANTS OF DISCLOSURE 
 
In Panel A the determinants (DETERMINAMTS) for each of the four disclosure quality measures (PCTRNK, PCTREL, PCTANL, PCTOPB) are investigated. The main 
purpose of these regressions is to demonstrate that variables  we identified as determinants of disclosure and classified into Performance, Structure and Offer groupings 
relate to the level of disclosure (in addition to the variables in Sengupta (1998)). Panel B reports F-statistics from an ANOVA analysis to demonstrate that firm-specific 
effects alone explain a larger proportion of variation in the disclosure proxies as the determinants in the regressions in Panel A. An F-test is used to test for the 
significance of the differences in firm-specific disclosure levels. The sample includes 100 companies and 358 firm-year observations. Standard errors are White 
heteroscedasticity consistent. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
PANEL A: OLS Estimation 
itkkit TSDETERMINANInterceptDisclosure εβ ++=   
 
Type of Discl.   (A) TOTAL RANK (PCTRNK) (B) INV. RELATIONS (PCTREL) (C) ANNUAL (PCTANL) (D) OTHER PUBL. (PCTOPB) 
Variable Sign Coeff. St. Dev. P-value Coeff. St. Dev. P-value Coeff. St. Dev. P-value Coeff. St. Dev. P-value 
C  -0.252 0.258 [.330] -0.209 0.263 [.428] -0.295 0.252 [.241] 0.028 0.268 [.916] 
GROWTH + 0.418 0.176 [.018] 0.362 0.170 [.034] 0.473 0.171 [.006] 0.238 0.179 [.186] 
ROS +/- 0.499 0.415 [.229] 0.089 0.383 [.817] 0.274 0.389 [.481] 0.548 0.434 [.207] 
FROS - -0.722 0.408 [.078] -0.357 0.375 [.342] -0.382 0.405 [.346] -0.786 0.437 [.073] 
LOSS + 0.039 0.074 [.598] -0.060 0.072 [.407] 0.048 0.068 [.479] 0.098 0.070 [.162] 
FROSXGR - -5.306 2.454 [.031] -5.378 1.804 [.003] -3.204 1.988 [.108] -3.698 2.680 [.169] 
MTB + 0.001 0.007 [.860] 0.007 0.008 [.377] 0.003 0.007 [.645] 0.003 0.007 [.674] 
LASSET + 0.023 0.016 [.136] 0.030 0.016 [.059] 0.018 0.016 [.257] 0.009 0.017 [.583] 
CAPEXP + 0.656 0.276 [.018] 0.425 0.283 [.134] 0.651 0.273 [.018] 0.562 0.280 [.045] 
MOODRNK - 0.002 0.001 [.001] 0.001 0.001 [.028] 0.002 0.001 [.001] 0.002 0.001 [.000] 
ISSUES + 0.010 0.005 [.023] 0.011 0.005 [.023] 0.010 0.005 [.032] 0.006 0.007 [.400] 
                  
Adj-R2  0.096    0.082   0.081    0.065   
NOB:   358     358     358     358     
 
PANEL B:  Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of Disclosure quality proxies 
   TOTAL RANK (PCTRNK) INV. RELATIONS (PCTREL) ANNUAL (PCTANL) OTHER PUBL. (PCTOPB) 
Adj-R2   0.617   0.523   0.557   0.642   
H0: αI=α   F(99,258) 6.821 [0.0000] F(99,258) 4.948 [0.0000] F(99,258) 5.541 [0.0000] F(99,258) 7.492 [0.0000] 
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TABLE 7 
AUGMENTED MODEL ESTIMATED FOR FOUR DISCLOSURE MEASURES USING ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
 
itllkkjjiiitit ControlOfferStructureePerformancDisclosureInterceptYIELD εβββββ ++++++= + 11  
a. In addition to control variables in Sengupta’s model (Control), the model includes three additional groupings of control variables: Performance, Structure and Offer. 
Performance captures the future prospects of the company. Structure captures information asymmetries between investors and the firm and the economies of scope in 
producing information. Offer measures the extent of capital market transactions. All three groups are related in theory to the level of disclosure and to YIELD. 
Type of Disclosure   (A) TOTAL DISCLOSURE (B) INV REL. (PCTREL) (C) ANNUAL (PCTANL) (D) OTHER (PCTOPB) 
Variable Sign Coeff. St.Dev  P-value Coeff. St.Dev  P-value Coeff. St.Dev  P-value Coeff. St.Dev  P-value 
Disclosure - -0.172 0.111 [.122] -0.095 0.096 [.320] -0.154 0.118 [.193] -0.062 0.102 [.543] 
Performance                
GROWTH - -1.200 0.337 [.000] -1.237 0.347 [.000] -1.210 0.335 [.000] -1.260 0.350 [.000] 
FROS - -1.032 1.005 [.305] -0.932 0.995 [.350] -0.978 0.989 [.323] -0.939 1.008 [.352] 
LOSS + 0.329 0.206 [.111] 0.319 0.208 [.126] 0.330 0.205 [.107] 0.332 0.204 [.105] 
MTB - -0.047 0.014 [.001] -0.048 0.014 [.001] -0.048 0.015 [.001] -0.049 0.015 [.001] 
FROSXGR +/- 1.051 3.873 [.786] 1.343 3.963 [.735] 1.403 3.952 [.723] 1.573 3.942 [.690] 
Structure                
CAPEXP - 0.484 0.831 [.561] 0.397 0.838 [.636] 0.460 0.838 [.583] 0.377 0.839 [.654] 
MOODRNK - -0.005 0.001 [.000] -0.005 0.001 [.000] -0.005 0.001 [.000] -0.005 0.001 [.000] 
Offer                
ISSUES - 0.007 0.011 [.510] 0.006 0.011 [.555] 0.007 0.011 [.528] 0.006 0.011 [.592] 
Controls                
LEV + 1.607 0.330 [.000] 1.664 0.334 [.000] 1.611 0.330 [.000] 1.645 0.331 [.000] 
COVER - -0.002 0.005 [.644] -0.001 0.005 [.908] -0.001 0.005 [.776] 0.000 0.005 [.946] 
ROS - 0.138 1.042 [.895] 0.034 1.036 [.974] 0.094 1.029 [.928] 0.054 1.049 [.959] 
LASSET - -0.135 0.046 [.003] -0.136 0.046 [.003] -0.135 0.045 [.003] -0.138 0.046 [.003] 
SIZE + 0.001 0.000 [.004] 0.001 0.000 [.005] 0.001 0.000 [.005] 0.001 0.000 [.005] 
RISK + 0.563 0.205 [.006] 0.549 0.203 [.007] 0.576 0.210 [.007] 0.561 0.207 [.007] 
LMATUR + -0.001 0.003 [.764] -0.001 0.003 [.722] -0.001 0.003 [.715] -0.001 0.003 [.740] 
CALL + 0.386 0.124 [.002] 0.379 0.122 [.002] 0.393 0.129 [.002] 0.375 0.121 [.002] 
CONVER - -3.044 0.294 [.000] -3.038 0.297 [.000] -3.041 0.296 [.000] -3.030 0.297 [.000] 
SUBOR + 0.021 0.292 [.942] 0.015 0.297 [.960] 0.015 0.293 [.958] 0.009 0.296 [.976] 
TBILL +  1.050 0.028 [.000] 1.053 0.028 [.000] 1.047 0.029 [.000] 1.052 0.028 [.000] 
RISKPR + 0.454 0.267 [.091] 0.460 0.269 [.088] 0.462 0.267 [.084] 0.464 0.270 [.086] 
C  2.581 0.787 [.001] 2.571 0.790 [.001] 2.593 0.792 [.001] 2.595 0.798 [.001] 
Adj-R2   0.872     0.872     0.872     0.871     
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b. Equation (2) is estimated using pooled OLS. The columns A-D of the table report on each of four disclosure quality proxies respectively: total disclosure quality 
(TOTRNK), quality of investor relations (PCTREL), quality of annual reports (PCTANL), and quality of quarterly and other publications (PCTOPB). All four measures of 
disclosure are constructed using AIMR-FAF disclosure scores for the period 1986-1996. The disclosure scores are converted to within industry percentage rankings in order to 
achieve better comparability across industries and over time: for each year and each industry the firms are ranked based upon disclosure score, then the rankings are divided by 
the number of firms being ranked. Sample includes 100 companies, which amount to 358 firm-year observations. In order to avoid double counting we use only first debt issue 




AUGMENTED MODEL ESTIMATED FOR FOUR DISCLOSURE MEASURES USING FIXED EFFECTS 
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a. In addition to control variables in Sengupta’s model (Control), the model here includes three additional groupings of control variables: Performance, Structure and 
Offer. Performance captures the future prospects of the company. Structure captures information asymmetries between investors and the firm and the economies of scope in 
producing information. Offer measures the extent of capital market transactions. All three groups are related in theory to the level of disclosure and to YIELD. 
Type of Disclosure   (A) TOTAL DISCLOSURE (B) INV REL. (PCTREL) (C) ANNUAL (PCTANL) (D) OTHER (PCTOPB) 
Variable Sign Coeff. St.Dev  P-value Coeff. St.Dev  P-value Coeff. St.Dev  P-value Coeff. St.Dev  P-value 
Disclosure - -0.400 0.130 [.002] -0.377 0.118 [.002] -0.348 0.134 [.010] -0.223 0.133 [.094] 
Performance                 
GROWTH - -0.575 0.410 [.162] -0.685 0.412 [.098] -0.636 0.416 [.128] -0.713 0.425 [.095] 
FROS - -0.192 1.153 [.868] 0.061 1.159 [.958] -0.197 1.169 [.866] -0.143 1.158 [.902] 
LOSS + 0.162 0.146 [.268] 0.121 0.152 [.425] 0.176 0.148 [.235] 0.167 0.153 [.276] 
MTB - -0.020 0.024 [.402] -0.014 0.025 [.564] -0.021 0.025 [.394] -0.023 0.024 [.341] 
FROSXGR +/- 5.123 4.713 [.278] 5.082 4.685 [.279] 5.043 4.728 [.287] 5.719 4.762 [.231] 
Structure                 
CAPEXP - 0.410 1.044 [.695] 0.167 1.063 [.875] 0.382 1.047 [.716] 0.361 1.062 [.734] 
MOODRNK - -0.001 0.003 [.697] -0.001 0.003 [.809] -0.001 0.003 [.653] -0.001 0.003 [.620] 
Offer                 
ISSUES - 0.007 0.012 [.565] 0.007 0.012 [.569] 0.007 0.012 [.540] 0.007 0.012 [.600] 
Controls                 
LEV + 1.585 0.638 [.014] 1.682 0.646 [.010] 1.594 0.641 [.014] 1.703 0.651 [.010] 
COVER - 0.000 0.010 [.967] 0.001 0.010 [.918] -0.005 0.010 [.604] -0.002 0.010 [.797] 
ROS - -3.021 1.172 [.011] -3.204 1.193 [.008] -2.896 1.163 [.013] -3.110 1.180 [.009] 
LASSET - -0.107 0.141 [.452] -0.126 0.142 [.378] -0.144 0.137 [.294] -0.143 0.134 [.290] 
SIZE + 0.001 0.000 [.006] 0.001 0.000 [.004] 0.001 0.000 [.006] 0.001 0.000 [.006] 
RISK + 0.193 0.165 [.244] 0.167 0.160 [.296] 0.202 0.165 [.222] 0.179 0.164 [.277] 
LMATUR + 0.000 0.003 [.960] -0.001 0.003 [.737] 0.000 0.003 [.939] -0.001 0.003 [.739] 
CALL + 0.237 0.097 [.015] 0.257 0.098 [.009] 0.250 0.096 [.010] 0.239 0.097 [.014] 
CONVER - -3.099 0.446 [.000] -3.121 0.445 [.000] -3.130 0.447 [.000] -3.102 0.452 [.000] 
SUBOR + 0.237 0.364 [.515] 0.226 0.366 [.538] 0.239 0.370 [.519] 0.190 0.374 [.611] 
TBILL +  1.060 0.029 [.000] 1.068 0.029 [.000] 1.055 0.028 [.000] 1.062 0.028 [.000] 
RISKPR + 0.599 0.264 [.024] 0.595 0.266 [.026] 0.599 0.264 [.024] 0.642 0.270 [.018] 
C               
Adj-R2   0.920     0.920   0.919   0.918   
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b. The columns A-D of the table report on each of four disclosure quality proxies respectively: total disclosure quality (TOTRNK), quality of investor relations 
(PCTREL), quality of annual reports (PCTANL), and quality of quarterly and other publications (PCTOPB). All four measures of disclosure are constructed using AIMR-FAF 
disclosure scores for the period 1986-1996. The disclosure scores are converted to within industry percentage rankings in order to achieve better comparability across industries 
and over time: for each year and each industry the firms are ranked based upon disclosure score, then the rankings are divided by the number of firms being ranked.  
c. The displayed results are the estimates from Fixed Effects regression for Equation (3).  
d. Sample includes 100 companies, which amount to 358 firm-year observations. In order to avoid double counting we use only first debt issue in a given year to measure 
























RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF DISCLOSURE QUALITY AND COST OF DEBT: MODEL IN DIFFERENCES 
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a. The Equation (3) model is estimated in differences. Differencing is alternative method to remove unobserved heterogeneity bias since the firm specific effects 
drop out from the model. The results are similar to Fixed Effects treatment. Column A reports the findings for the measure of total disclosure quality (PCTRNK). 
Type of Discl.   TOTAL RANK RELATIONS ANNUAL OTHER 
Variable Sign Coeff.  St Dev  P-value Coeff. St Dev  P-value Coeff. St Dev  P-value Coeff. St Dev  P-value 
∆Disclosure - -0.418 0.144 [.004] -0.379 0.128 [.004] -0.393 0.130 [.003] -0.168 0.140 [.233] 
∆Performance                 
∆GROWTH - -0.281 0.436 [.520] -0.349 0.436 [.425] -0.278 0.443 [.530] -0.379 0.446 [.396] 
∆FROS - 0.172 1.346 [.899] 0.592 1.315 [.653] 0.265 1.349 [.845] 0.341 1.351 [.801] 
∆LOSS + 0.288 0.126 [.023] 0.239 0.130 [.068] 0.290 0.124 [.020] 0.278 0.138 [.044] 
∆MTB - -0.032 0.025 [.210] -0.025 0.025 [.324] -0.033 0.026 [.196] -0.033 0.025 [.189] 
∆FROSXGR +/- 11.485 5.862 [.051] 11.715 5.709 [.041] 11.595 5.741 [.045] 13.267 5.879 [.025] 
∆Structure                 
∆CAPEXP - 1.580 1.235 [.202] 1.330 1.266 [.294] 1.673 1.244 [.180] 1.558 1.272 [.222] 
∆MOODRNK - 0.001 0.003 [.645] 0.002 0.003 [.574] 0.001 0.003 [.717] 0.001 0.003 [.871] 
∆Offer                 
∆ISSUES - 0.007 0.015 [.629] 0.005 0.015 [.726] 0.008 0.015 [.596] 0.008 0.015 [.583] 
∆Controls                 
∆LEV + 1.048 0.751 [.164] 1.154 0.760 [.131] 1.074 0.757 [.157] 1.110 0.766 [.149] 
∆COVER - -0.003 0.009 [.771] -0.003 0.010 [.742] -0.006 0.009 [.504] -0.005 0.010 [.594] 
∆ROS - -3.702 1.047 [.000] -3.900 1.032 [.000] -3.576 1.038 [.001] -3.749 1.038 [.000] 
∆LASSET - 0.284 0.199 [.155] 0.295 0.202 [.147] 0.260 0.206 [.207] 0.260 0.201 [.198] 
∆SIZE + 0.001 0.000 [.088] 0.001 0.000 [.059] 0.001 0.000 [.077] 0.001 0.000 [.083] 
∆RISK + -0.311 0.285 [.275] -0.336 0.280 [.231] -0.333 0.280 [.236] -0.329 0.288 [.255] 
∆LMATUR + 0.003 0.003 [.433] 0.002 0.003 [.601] 0.003 0.003 [.410] 0.002 0.003 [.610] 
∆CALL + 0.136 0.093 [.142] 0.172 0.093 [.065] 0.145 0.092 [.117] 0.158 0.092 [.087] 
∆CONVER - -2.897 0.361 [.000] -2.927 0.358 [.000] -2.910 0.358 [.000] -2.906 0.365 [.000] 
∆SUBOR + 0.295 0.316 [.351] 0.280 0.310 [.368] 0.319 0.324 [.325] 0.266 0.327 [.418] 
∆TBILL +  1.077 0.033 [.000] 1.082 0.033 [.000] 1.064 0.031 [.000] 1.075 0.033 [.000] 
∆RISKPR + 0.917 0.281 [.001] 0.932 0.280 [.001] 0.905 0.283 [.002] 0.995 0.289 [.001] 
C  -0.030 0.042 [.468] -0.042 0.042 [.317] -0.036 0.043 [.399] -0.038 0.043 [.380] 
Adj-R2   0.872   0.871   0.872   0.868   
NOB:   258     258     258     258     
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Columns B-D report on measures of quality of investor relations (PCTREL), annual reports (PCTANL), and quarterly and other publications (PCTOPB). All four 
measures of disclosure are constructed using AIMR-FAF disclosure scores for the period 1986-1996. The disclosure scores are converted to within industry percentage 
rankings in order to achieve better comparability across industries and over time: for each year and each industry the firms are ranked based upon disclosure score, then 
the rankings are divided by the number of firms being ranked.  
b. In addition to control variables in Sengupta’s model (Control), the model here includes three additional groupings of control variables: Performance, Structure 
and Offer. Performance captures the future prospects of the company. Structure captures information asymmetries between investors and the firm and the economies of 
scope in producing information. Offer measures the extent of capital market transactions. All three groups are related in theory to the level of disclosure band to  YIELD. 
Sample includes 100 companies, which amount to 258 firm-year observations. In order to avoid double counting we use only first debt issue in a given year to measure 










AUXILIARY REGRESSION PROPOSED BY MUNDLAK (1978) 
 
 1  ++++= llkkjjiiiti ControlOfferStructureePerformancDisclosure κκκκκα  
Table provides estimates of an auxiliary regression introduced by Mundlak (1978) and their significance levels based on t-test. An upper bar over the variables included in 
the model indicates the firm-specific averages of regressors. Test statistics constructed using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors from Within and Between 
estimators (described in more detail in Appendix B) and using the fact that the latter and the former are independent under the null hypothesis of no misspecification. The 
results suggest a positive correlation between the error term and the dependent variable. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Type of Discl.   TOTAL RANK RELATIONS ANNUAL OTHER 
Variable Sign Coeff.  St Dev  P-value Coeff. St Dev  P-value Coeff. St Dev  P-value Coeff. St Dev  P-value 
PCTRNK  0.319 0.166 0.056 0.542 0.159 0.001 0.212 0.172 0.219 0.241 0.165 0.146 
Performance                 
GROWTH  -1.350 0.858 0.117 -1.327 0.862 0.125 -1.262 0.865 0.146 -1.236 0.872 0.157 
FROS  -4.609 4.708 0.328 -4.564 4.692 0.332 -4.658 4.703 0.323 -4.529 4.726 0.339 
LOSS  0.159 0.219 0.470 0.224 0.224 0.318 0.130 0.222 0.559 0.165 0.226 0.464 
MTB  -0.021 0.025 0.398 -0.032 0.025 0.201 -0.019 0.025 0.453 -0.020 0.025 0.434 
FROSXGR  -7.251 50.529 0.886 -6.822 50.387 0.892 -6.862 50.496 0.892 -7.794 50.670 0.878 
Structure                 
CAPEXP  -1.051 2.342 0.654 -1.126 2.353 0.633 -0.973 2.327 0.676 -1.129 2.329 0.628 
MOODRNK  -0.004 0.003 0.134 -0.005 0.003 0.078 -0.004 0.003 0.161 -0.004 0.003 0.148 
Offer                 
ISSUES  0.001 0.013 0.948 -0.007 0.013 0.583 0.002 0.013 0.900 -0.002 0.013 0.871 
Controls                 
LEV  -0.651 0.958 0.497 -0.684 0.954 0.474 -0.677 0.957 0.480 -0.712 0.972 0.464 
COVER  -0.006 0.010 0.556 -0.002 0.010 0.810 -0.001 0.010 0.945 -0.001 0.010 0.930 
ROS  7.144 4.348 0.101 7.100 4.333 0.102 7.078 4.328 0.103 7.118 4.378 0.105 
LASSET  0.001 0.146 0.995 0.024 0.147 0.873 0.040 0.141 0.776 0.040 0.139 0.776 
SIZE  0.000 0.000 0.540 0.000 0.000 0.885 0.000 0.000 0.525 0.000 0.000 0.688 
RISK  1.477 0.373 0.000 1.545 0.369 0.000 1.509 0.376 0.000 1.491 0.373 0.000 
LMATUR  -0.002 0.003 0.428 -0.001 0.003 0.776 -0.003 0.003 0.370 -0.001 0.003 0.670 
CALL  0.531 0.156 0.001 0.475 0.157 0.003 0.544 0.158 0.001 0.512 0.156 0.001 
CONVER  0.263 0.626 0.674 0.360 0.625 0.565 0.288 0.625 0.646 0.293 0.632 0.643 
SUBOR  -0.534 0.501 0.288 -0.544 0.503 0.281 -0.555 0.508 0.275 -0.489 0.512 0.341 
TBILL  -0.065 0.036 0.067 -0.082 0.036 0.024 -0.066 0.034 0.058 -0.072 0.035 0.042 






AUGEMENTED MODEL ESTIMATED USING OLS AND FIXED EFFECTS ON A SAMPLE OF 
FIRMS WITH SUBSTANTIAL DISCLOSURE POLICY CHANGES 
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This table reports the results of OLS and fixed effects estimation of Equation (3), but restricts the 
sample to observations with substantive changes in disclosure. Substantive changes are defined as 
cases when a firm moves between two consecutive observations from disclosure quality decile k to 
decile k±i, where i is greater or equal to 2. The sample consists of 68 firms with 182 firm-year 
observations. Deciles are formed on the entire set of companies ranked by AIMR in a given year.  
Estimator:   OLS (αi=0) WITHIN (FIXED EFFECTS) 
Variable Sign Coeff. St.Dev  P-value Coeff. St.Dev  P-value 
PCTRNK - -0.188 0.181 [.300] -0.324 0.149 [.032] 
Performance        
GROWTH - -0.997 0.439 [.025] -0.732 0.552 [.188] 
FROS - -1.607 1.323 [.226] -1.520 1.747 [.387] 
LOSS + 0.531 0.286 [.065] 0.177 0.204 [.389] 
MTB - -0.041 0.024 [.093] -0.048 0.030 [.115] 
FROSXGR +/- -1.281 4.470 [.775] -1.869 8.806 [.832] 
Structure        
CAPEXP - -0.175 1.130 [.877] -1.156 1.627 [.479] 
MOODRNK - -0.656 0.001 [.000] -0.973 0.003 [.781] 
Offer        
ISSUES - 0.041 0.032 [.198] 0.040 0.039 [.308] 
Controls        
LEV + 1.342 0.432 [.002] 1.537 1.162 [.189] 
COVER - -0.242 0.010 [.804] -0.497 0.020 [.807] 
ROS - 1.275 1.314 [.333] -3.786 1.804 [.039] 
LASSET - -0.212 0.070 [.003] -0.218 0.197 [.273] 
SIZE + 0.001 0.000 [.141] 0.001 0.000 [.051] 
RISK + 0.395 0.282 [.164] -0.218 0.199 [.277] 
LMATUR + -0.176 0.004 [.648] 0.001 0.004 [.778] 
CALL + 0.509 0.177 [.005] 0.137 0.138 [.322] 
CONVER - -2.806 0.434 [.000] -2.776 0.233 [.000] 
SUBOR + -0.756 0.407 [.065] -0.434 0.481 [.369] 
TBILL +  1.046 0.039 [.000] 1.057 0.040 [.000] 
RISKPR + 0.787 0.379 [.039] 1.198 0.368 [.002] 
C  3.024 1.007 [.003]    
Adj-R2   0.857     0.942     
